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Summary 
This thesis evaluates the conduct of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees in relation to a tripartite Memorandum of Understanding with 
Sweden and Afghanistan, which aims to facilitate voluntary return of 
Afghan asylum seekers from Sweden to Afghanistan. The Memorandum 
was concluded in the context of deteriorating security in Afghanistan and 
the vocal opposition of a community of asylum seekers opposed to return. 
The thesis establishes that the High Commissioner's purpose include inter 
alia the protection of asylum seekers' rights and welfare. It is also 
determined that the High Commissioner possesses sufficient international 
personality to conclude treaties, and that the Memorandum is a treaty. But 
after establishing the source and content of rules governing the High 
Commissioners activities, this thesis concludes that the Commissioner has 
breached said rules since its participation in the Memorandum is detrimental 
to the rights of asylum seekers. The Author argues that such a violation of 
internal rules is an illegal act, for which those that the High Commissioner 
is supposed to protect are left without recourse to a remedy. For this reason 
the High Commissioner should revive its focus on strict adherence to legal 
norms. 
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Preface 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nog finns det mål och mening i vår färd - 
men det är vägen, som är mödan värd.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Jessica Yeh, who made this thesis possible 
To UNHCR’s hardworking staff in Stockholm whom I admire 
And to all other who provided me with invaluable insight and inspiration 
 
Lund, 18 August 2008 
Victor Lengquist 
 
                                                 
1 K. Boye, 'I rörelse', in D. Hjorth (ed.), Dikter Kallocain Kris (Bonniers, Falun, 1992) pp. 
301-02. 
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Abbreviations 
AIHRC – Afghanistan Independent Human Rights 
Commission 
CAT – Convention Against Torture 
CNN – Cable News Network 
ECOSOC – United Nations Economic and Social Council 
ExCom – UNHCR Executive Committee  
HRW – Human Rights Watch 
ICCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
ICESCR – International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
ICJ – International Court of Justice 
iDMC – Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
IDP – Internally Displaced Person 
ILC – International Law Commission 
IOM – International Organisation for Migration 
IRIN – Integrated Regional Information Networks 
IRO – International Refugee Organisation 
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force 
IWPR – Institute for War and Peace Reporting 
MoU – Memorandum of Understanding 
NOAS – Norwegian Organisations for Asylum Seekers 
OAU – Organisation of African Unity 
RSD – Refugee Status Determination 
SCB – (Swedish) Statistical Central Bureau 
SFS – Swedish Collection of Statutes (Svensk 
Författnings Samling) 
SMB – Swedish Migration Board 
TT – Swedish News Agency (Tidningarnas 
Telegrambyrå)  
UNAMA – United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan 
UNCTAD – UN Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDSS – UN Department of Safety and Security 
UNGA – UN General Assembly 
UN-HABITAT – UN Human Settlements Programme 
UNHCHR – UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
UNHCR – UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNMIK – UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
UNSC – UN Security Council 
UNSG – UN Secretary General 
UNTS – UN Treaty Series 
VCLT69 – Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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VCLT86 – Vienna Convention on Treaties Between States 
and International Organizations or International 
Organizations 
WHO – World Health Organisation 
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1 Introduction  
On the 7th of October 2001, the United States launched an invasion of 
Afghanistan with reference to the right of self-defence contained in the 
United Nations Charter Article 51. Afghanistan had been ravaged by war for 
ages and neighbouring countries were already home to many Afghans who 
had fled earlier perils. But following 2001, for the first time Afghan 
Refugees also reached Western countries en masse. Sweden was one of their 
destinations.  
 
In connection to the increased inflow of Afghans, Sweden concluded a 
Memorandum of Understanding with Afghanistan and the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in June 2007. The purpose was 
to facilitate the orderly return of Afghans determined as not qualifying for 
Refugee status. A month earlier, the Afghan asylum seeker community had 
clearly shown its opposition to signals from the government that the time to 
go home had come for those with temporary residence permits.  
 
Based on the cynical notion that everyone is her own best friend, it is easy 
to formulate theories why the two States involved would be interested in the 
return of Afghans. For Sweden as a host State, return of those rejected by its 
national Refugee Status Determination procedure is a question of defending 
the integrity of that system and keeping the inflow of asylum seekers at a 
manageable level. The Afghan government's stake in return is its need to 
prove its worth and avert the loss of invaluable human capital. The accuracy 
of these theories is not important. Their importance lies in the Author's 
inability to derive any similar theory of self-serving purpose for UNHCR's 
involvement with the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).  
 
UNHCR is an entity whose self-stated primary purpose is the protection of 
Refugee's “rights and welfare”. Assuming that Afghans who left their homes 
to seek asylum in Sweden did not do so for reasons of leisure, can UNHCR 
participate in an agreement the purpose of which is to return them to whence 
they fled? The purpose of this thesis is twofold: to demonstrate that this 
question is of a legal character, and to produce an answer to that question. 
 
The thesis will first describe the general situation in Afghanistan so that the 
reader can form her own opinion about the Afghans' reasons for flight 
(Chapter 2). Then follows a brief description of the impact of the Afghan's 
flight in Sweden and events surrounding the negotiation of the MoU 
(Chapter 3). The above provides a basic understanding of the document and 
the context within which it operates. Next, UNHCR is introduced with a 
view to describe its functioning and purpose (Chapter 4). Then its place in 
relation to international law is assessed to ascertain that it is the proper 
normative order within which to evaluate UNHCR's behaviour (Chapter 5). 
A similar analysis is carried out regarding the MoU (Chapter 6). When the 
foundation is laid accordingly, the Author will determine whether UNHCR 
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was legally justified to participate in the conclusion of the MoU (Chapters 7 
to 9). A few words will be devoted to the effect of illegal acts under 
international law (Chapter 10) before the thesis is summarised and a 
conclusion presented (Chapter 11). 
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2 The Situation in Afghanistan 
Afghanistan is an arid and mountainous country, entirely landlocked with a 
distinctly continental climate. Summers are warm and without rain. Winters 
are cold, windy and snow filled. The last population census in Afghanistan 
together with later estimates reveal that 26 million people call the country 
their home.2 But condition are undoubtedly harsh. Afghans can expect to 
grow no older than 42 years, as compared to 82 for Swedes.3  
 
To blame the climate for low life expectancy would be to simplify the 
problems that face Afghanistan. With a mere glance at its history, one easily 
acquire a better understanding of the reasons. The lasting impression is that 
there have not been any extended periods of continuous peace since the 
emergence of Afghanistan as a State sometime in the mid 1800s. Civil wars 
and foreign invasions have taken turns to destroy the lives of those who are 
unfortunate enough to dwell between the mountains. British (three times), 
Soviet, American, and “International” troops have replaced each other over 
the course of time.4 
 
The last invasion was launched by the United States on 7 October 2001.5 It 
was explained both as a response to the Afghan Government's refusal to 
hand over suspect terrorist elements residing in the country,6 and as an act 
of self defence in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) 
Charter.7 Initially, the American engagement was largely by proxy through 
air support to domestic players opposed to the Taliban regime.8 American 
troops arrived on the scene in November 2001.9 Before long, victory was 
declared as the Taliban regime lost control over the last major city within a 
month.10 Plans that had already been drawn up for the material and political 
                                                 
2 National Encyclopaedia of Sweden, Afghanistan (2008) 
<www.ne.se/jsp/search/article.jsp?i_art_id=108845>, visited on 10 June 2008; WHO, 
World Health Statistics 2008 (2008) p. 26, 
<www.who.int/entity/whosis/whostat/EN_WHS08_Full.pdf>, visited on 10 June 2008. 
3 WHO, Afghanistan – Mortality Country Fact Sheet 2006 (2006) p. 1, 
<www.who.int/whosis/mort/profiles/mort_emro_afg_afghanistan.pdf>, visited on 6 June 
2008; SCB, Statistisk årsbok 2008 (2008) p. 668. 
4 UNAMA, Afghanistan and UN, A Historical Perspective, <www.unama-
afg.org/about/info.htm>, visited on 10 June 2008; E. O'Ballance, Afghan Wars - 1839 to the 
Present (Brassey's, London, 2002) pp. xv-xix. 
5 'US-led military strikes against Afghanistan', 47 Keesing's Record of World Events (2001) 
p. 44391. 
6 CNN, Transcript of President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress on Thursday 
night, 20 September 2001, <archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>, visited 
on 10 June 2008; HRW, 'Lessons in Terror', 6(C) Human Rights Watch (2006) p. 13, <>, 
visited on 25 July 2008. 
7 'International Response to Military Action', 47 Keesing's Record of World Events (2001) 
p. 44393. 
8 O'Ballance, supra note 4, p. 249. 
9 O'Ballance, supra note 4, p. 257. 
10 T. Shanker and E. Schmitt, 'A Nation Challenged: Military Campaign; Taliban Defeated, 
Pentagon Asserts, But War Goes On', New York Times, 11 December 2001, 
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reconstruction of the country were put in motion.11 However, the old regime 
did not leave the stage willingly. After two more years of continued 
hostilities the invaders decided to declare themselves victorious again, 
hopeful that the end had come to all major combat operations.12  
 
Eight thousand American soldiers still remained in Afghanistan, supported 
by the International Community through an additional 35,460 soldiers 
enrolled in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).13 This is far 
less than what military experts have called for,14 and the results can be seen 
in the deteriorating security situation and the former regime's regained 
strength.15 The southern parts of Afghanistan were pushed back into open 
war by the insurgency in the end of 2006.16 A year later, all but a few 
northern provinces were ravaged by open conflict and the Taliban have 
extended their reach to provinces hitherto beyond their capacity.17 
 
In 2006 and 2007, the insurgents carried out one suicide attack every third 
day in average.18 Though the majority of attacks were aimed at military 
targets, 70 percent of them carried higher civilian than military causalities.19 
In all, there were 566 violent insurgency related incidents per month in 
2007, killing 1500 civilians.20 Private security guards, government and 
international forces were to blame for a little less than half of these deaths.21 
                                                                                                                            
<query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE3DC173FF932A25751C1A9679C8B63
&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all>, visited 11 June 2008. 
11 Copy of the “Bonn Agreement” detailing the political reconstruction of Afghanistan: 
UNSG, Letter dated 5 December 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council (S/2001/1154) pp. 2-12. 
12 Donald Rumsfeld reports, during a joint press conference in Kabul, that major combat 
operations have ended as of 1 May 2003: 'May 2003 Afghanistan', 49 Keesing's Record of 
World Events (2003) p. 45403. 
13 Troops deployed as of 7 February 2007: UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its 
implications for international peace and security (A/61/799) p. 8. 
14 HRW, World Report 2007 (2007) p. 241, <www.hrw.org/wr2k7/wr2007master.pdf>, 
visited 7 June 2008. 
15 UNDSS, Afghanistan; Topic Assessment 02/07 (Half Year Review of the Security 
Situation in Afghanistan) (2007) pp. 1-2, 
<media.mcclatchydc.com/smedia/2007/10/01/16/UNAMA_2007_Afghanistan.source.prod
_affiliate.91.pdf>, visited on 7 June 2008. 
16 UNSG, The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and 
Security (A/61/326) p. 2. 
17 The Taliban are believed to have a hand in incidents in provinces they never conquered 
(Balkh, Jawzjan, Sar-i Pul, and Badakhshan): IWPR, 'A Long, Bloody Summer Ahead', 219 
Afghan Recovery Report (2006) 
<www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=321615&apc_state=heniarr1f22aa935c1e7b3b15bf3a868e5
39ad0>, visited on 8 June 2008. 
18 UNSG, The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and 
Security (A/62/722) p. 5. 
19 UNHCHR, Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of 
Human Rights and on the Achievements of Technical Assistance in the Field of Human 
Rights (A/HRC/7/27) p. 4. 
20 UNSG, supra note 18, p. 4. 
21 UNHCHR, supra note 19, p. 9. 
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Most civilian deaths could have been averted if military action by both sides 
was not so largely indiscriminate by nature.22 
 
In addition to the lives claimed by the insurgency, 2000 civilians met a 
violent death for other reasons in 2006.23 Perhaps this should not come as a 
surprise in a country where drug production accounts for 50 percent of all 
national income,24 and local warlords guilty of serious human rights 
transgressions continue to hold positions of power in many regions.25 The 
prevalence of land disputes, many times a matter of life and death, also 
constitute a major source of insecurity. Their explosiveness is worsened by 
the absence of regulations that might render it possible to resolve such 
disputes in court.26 The situation is aggravated by the government's inability 
to deliver justice and security to the people, much less access many 
provinces in the southern, southeastern and eastern parts of the country.27  
 
In those areas where the government is in control, corruption is rampant and 
the justice system is without accountability.28 It is weak on its delivery of 
justice and more generous on its delivery of arbitrary, illegal and 
incommunicado detention. People are detained and convicted for breaches 
of customary rules, Sharia law, and restrictions on their freedom of speech, 
all in contravention to Afghan statute.29 There are also allegations of forced 
confessions and torture, in particular against the secret police from the 
National Directorate of Security.30 This lack of legality is worrisome, 
especially with a prison population that is growing exponentially in 
overcrowded facilities.31 As a result of the government's impotence, most of 
those who seek justice turn to traditional fora such as village elders.32 This 
is to the detriment of women, who are traditionally of low value in Afghan 
society and used as goods of reparation in disputes.33 
 
Economic growth is hampered or reversed in most parts of Afghanistan by 
the prevailing insecurity and lawlessness, which is a serious situation for a 
country that is already the fifth poorest in the world, with 60 percent of the 
                                                 
22 HRW, 'The Human Cost', 6(C) Human Rights Watch (2007) pp. 3-4, 
<www.hrw.org/reports/2007/afghanistan0407/afghanistan0407web.pdf>, visited on 7 June 
2008. 
23 HRW, supra note 14, p. 238. 
24 HRW, supra note 14, p. 236. 
25 HRW, supra note 14, p. 238. 
26 UNHCHR, supra note 19, pp. 5-6. 
27 UNHCHR, supra note 19, p. 4; UNSG, supra note 18, p. 1; UNDSS, supra note 15, 
figure 2. 
28 HRW, supra note 14, p. 238. 
29 Amnesty International, USA: Amnesty International's supplementary briefing to the UN 
Committee against Torture (AMR 51/061/2006) p. 8; UNHCHR, supra note 19, pp. 14 and 
16; UNSG, supra note 18, p. 10. 
30 UNSG, supra note 18, p. 7. 
31 UNHCHR, supra note 19, p. 15. 
32 AIHRC, Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan (2006) pp. 40-42, 
<www.aihrc.org.af/rep_economic_socail_may_2006.pdf>, visited on 8 June 2008. 
33 UNHCHR, supra note 19, p. 7. 
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population living on less than a dollar per day.34 Positive economic 
development is confined to urban areas, especially Kabul,35 and indirectly 
attributable to drug trade or international aid.36 This makes many Afghans, 
who are unable to support themselves in the countryside flock to the cities, 
which currently grow by five percent each year.37 The 120,000 long-term 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) who exist in Afghanistan can be 
assumed to follow largely the same pattern although they are hard to 
distinguish from other urban poor.38 In 2007, their ranks were joined by 
37,000 freshly displaced individuals, mainly from southern Afghanistan.39 
 
With prohibitive rents and more than 70 percent of all urban infrastructure 
destroyed, new urban arrivals have little choice but to settle in self 
constructed slums or ruins.40 In Kabul alone roughly 2.4 million people, or 
80 percent of the population, dwell in immense informal settlements that 
cover more than two thirds of the city.41 An additional 15,000 people are 
wholly homeless, living in tents or ruins.42 Common to both groups is their 
lack of safe access to clean water, sewerage, electricity and drainage.43 Even 
this kind of life can be hard to sustain with unemployment figures, estimated 
by the Afghan government, at 33 percent.44 Research also shows that a 
slight majority of those who are “employed” rely on non-skilled day labour 
to sustain themselves and their families.45 The many that are unable to find 
work are forced to rely on their extended family, or clan affiliations, to 
                                                 
34 UNHCHR, supra note 19, p. 5. 
35 HRW, supra note 14, p. 236. 
36 UNSG, supra note 18, pp. 12-13. 
37 UN-HABITAT, 'Afghanistan: From Kabul to Vancouver, a common thread to vastly 
different cities', ReliefWeb, 21 Jun 2006, <reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EGUA-
6QZPP7?OpenDocument>, visited on 8 June 2008. 
38 iDMC, Afghanistan: Fighting in the south sets off new wave of displacement (2006) p. 
62, <www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/56E4BDEA45F3A679C125724C00
3CFD1B/$file/Afghanistan+-December+2006.pdf>, visited on 18 June 2008. 
39 UNHCHR, supra note 19, p. 10. 
40 A.H. Irfan et al., Action Contre Le Faim, Kabul Vulnerability Mapping (2004) pp. 24- 
26, <www.aah-usa.org/sites/default/files/upload/Kabul_report.pdf>, visited on 13 June 
2008; 
UN-HABITAT, 'Afghanistan: From Kabul to Vancouver, a common thread 
to vastly different cities', ReliefWeb, 21 Jun 2006, 
<reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EGUA-6QZPP7?OpenDocument>, visited on 8 
June 2008. 
41 World Bank, 'Kabul urban land crisis: A summary of issues and recommendations', 1 
Kabul Urban Policy Notes Series (2006) p. 2, 
<siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/223546-
1150905429722/Policy_Note_1.pdf>, visited on 9 June 2008. 
42 Ibid., p. 1. 
43 World Bank, 'Why and how should Kabul upgrade its informal settlements?', 2 Kabul 
Urban Policy Notes Series (2006) p. 3, 
<siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/223546-
1150905429722/PolicyNote2.pdf>, visited on 9 June 2008. 
44 IWPR, 'Jobless Face Grim Future', 222 Afghan Recovery Report (2006) 
<www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=322263&apc_state=heniarr2006>, visited on 8 June 2008. 
45 AIHRC, Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan II (2007) p. 12, 
<www.aihrc.org.af/Rep_ESRII_Eng_Full_Text_30_Aug_2007.pdf>, visited on 13 June 
2008. 
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survive.46 In urban areas this tends to meet with difficulty, even for those 
who have extended family close, as traditional forms of wealth distribution 
is limited or non-existent in such settings.47 
 
Despite the precarious situation in Kabul, there is not much that could 
motivate anyone who sought shelter there to leave the city again. The fact 
that land allocation to those returning from abroad and who are landless will 
only take place in their province of origin could work as an incentive.48 But 
with a general freeze of land allocation due to uncertainty of who owns what 
deprives the measure of all effect.49 Furthermore, national and international 
assistance programs in the south and southeast remain largely suspended 
since two years ago.50 With the insurgents' increased targeting of aid 
workers, more provinces are at risk of being left without humanitarian aid 
before long.51 UNHCR itself has access only to 55 percent of Afghanistan.52 
Insurgency related violence, criminality, impunity, land mines and poverty 
is what awaits most that dare set their foot outside Kabul. 
 
                                                 
46 S. Schütte, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Urban Vulnerability in 
Afghanistan: Case Studies From Three Cities (2004) p. 12, 
<www30.a2hosting.com/~areuorg?option=com_docman&Itemid=&task=doc_download&g
id=340>, visited 13 June 2008. 
47 Ibid., p. 30. 
48 IRIN-Asia, 'Afghanistan: Returnees Should Return to Their Provinces', Reliefweb, 30 
September 2005, 
<reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/36c97300e43a2abdc1257
08c004233c4?OpenDocument>, visited on 18 June 2008. 
49 UNHCR, UNHCR's Eligibility Guidelines For Assessing the International Protection 
Needs of Afghan Asylum-Seekers (2007) p. 56, 
<www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/477ce70a2.html>, visited on 27 July 2008. 
50 HRW, supra note 14, p. 77. 
51 UNSG, supra note 18, p. 5. 
52 UNHCHR, supra note 19, p. 10. 
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3 Sweden and the MoU 
As a likely consequence of how things unfolded in Afghanistan after the 
“US-led” invasion in 2001,53 Sweden received unprecedented numbers of 
Afghan asylum seekers. For the first time, a serious crisis in Afghanistan 
produced asylum seekers all over the world.54  
 
In the six years that followed the invasion, 4919 applications for asylum 
were lodged by Afghans in Sweden. This is not a stunning number in itself, 
considering that Sweden received 189,116 applications in total during the 
same period. However, the number speaks more clearly in relation to 
previous figures on arrivals from Afghanistan. A comparison reveals that 
the present crisis has produced more than twice as many Afghans who seek 
asylum in Sweden as the previous 12 years together.55 Together with 
unusually large arrivals from Iraq, one would imagine that this could have 
strained public acceptance and willingness in Sweden to host all those who 
arrive. Some argue that an increase in asylum seekers generally result in 
more restrictive asylum policy.56 However, there seems to be no conclusive 
evidence suggesting that public support for the right to seek refuge faltered 
in Sweden.57 Nevertheless, the large arrivals do coincide with novel efforts 
by Sweden to conclude return agreements with countries outside Europe, the 
purpose of which is to ease the return of individuals who are found not to 
                                                 
53 Although the established phrase indicates that several other countries actively 
participated in the invasion of Afghanistan there is no support for involvement by any other 
country than the United Kingdom on 31 October 2001. UK's involvement was largely 
limited to a supportive role, save firing some cruise missiles. In fact, the first mentioning in 
concrete terms of an additional State being involved occurs, in March, only after the 
Taliban “lost”: International Affairs & Defence Section, 'Operation Enduring Freedom and 
the Conflict in Afghanistan: An Update', 82 House of Commons Library Research Paper 
(2001) p. 26, <www.parliament.uk/publications/research.cfm>, visited on 6 August 2008; 
M.E. O'Hanlon, 'A Flawed Masterpiece', 3 Foreign Affairs (2002) pp. 49-50. 
54 K. Lumpp et al., 'Voluntary Repatriation to Afghanistan: Key Features', 3 Refugee Survey 
Quarterly (2006) p. 155. 
55 Swedish official statistics: Migrationsverket, Asylsökande till Sverige under 1984-2007 
(2008) <www.migrationsverket.se/pdffiler/statistik/tabs2.pdf>, visited on 6 June 2008.  
56 J.P. Brekke and G. Brochmann, Institute for Social Research, Trends in Scandinavian 
asylum policies (ISF Paper 2005:102) pp. 14-15, 
<www.samfunnsforskning.no/files/P_2005_102.pdf>, visited on 18 July 2008. 
57 The ever increasing frequency of reported hate crimes actually show a dip in the two 
years following 2001 and public acceptance of immigration actually improves slightly: 
Brottsförebyggande Rådet (BRÅ), Hatbrott 2007: En Sammanställning Av Anmälningar 
Med Främlingsfientliga, Islamofobiska, Antisemitiska och Homofobiska Motiv (Rapport 
2008:15) pp. 52-53; Integrationsverket, Fickfakta: Statistik Om Integration (2006) pp. 89-
99, 
<www.temaasyl.se/Documents/Statistik/Fickfakta%20Statistik%20om%20integration%202
006.pdf>, visited on 27 July 2008. 
 However in the 2006 elections, a party with a clearly racist agenda 
managed to secure seats in 144 out of 290 municipalities. Maybe larger parties are trying to 
pre-empt wider support by quietly making asylum policy more strict: Valmyndigheten, 
Kommunfullmäktigvalen 2006 - mandat för Sverigedemokraterna (2007) 
<www.val.se/val/val2006/slutlig_ovrigt/statistik/sd_2006.pdf>, visited 27 July 2008. 
 13
qualify for asylum.58 In relation to Afghanistan, the result was a tripartite 
agreement between Afghanistan, UNHCR and Sweden. 
3.1 Negotiations Between Sweden and 
Afghanistan 
On 22 May 2006, Sweden, Afghanistan and UNHCR signed a document in 
Kabul with the title:  
 
“Agreed Minutes of the Negotiations on the Tripartite Memorandum of 
Understanding (the MoU) between the Government of the Kingdom of 
Sweden, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and 
UNHCR”59  
 
The Memorandum of Understanding (the MoU) itself, attached to the 
minutes, was signed without changes on the 23 of June 2007 by all Parties.60 
It entered into effect upon signature and remained valid until 31 December 
the same year.61 The MoU was extended before its expiry through the 
signing of a new identical agreement on 26 of December 2007.62 The 
renewed MoU was signed by the Second Secretary of Political Affairs, 
Robert Peszkowski, on behalf of the Swedish Government, Deputy Minister 
of Refugees and Repatriation, Abdul Qader, on behalf of the Afghanistan 
Government and Senior Protection Officer, Aurvasi Patel, on behalf of 
UNHCR.63 It remains valid until 31 December 2008.64 
 
The MoU stipulates as its objective “to lay the basis for a [...] coordinated, 
phased and humane process of assisted return of Afghans in Sweden”.65 The 
MoU targeted Afghan asylum seekers awaiting a final decision as well as 
those who have had their asylum claims finally rejected.66 In exchange for 
their voluntary departure from Sweden to Afghanistan they can volunteer 
                                                 
58 Previous return agreements listed by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs include 
European states only: Database of Swedish international agreements online, search term 
'återtagande', <www.regeringen.se/sb/d/108>, visited on 18 July 2008;  
 However, EU wide agreements exist with Hong Kong, Sri Lanka and 
Macao: 'Agreement between the European Community and the Government of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China on the readmission 
of persons residing without authorisation', L 17 Official Journal of the European Union 
(2004) p. 25; 
 'Agreement between the European Community and the Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka on the readmission of persons residing without 
authorisation – Declarations', L 124 Official Journal of the European Union (2005) p. 43; 
 'Agreement between the European Community and the Macao Special 
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China on the readmission of persons 
residing without authorisation', L 143 Official Journal of the European Union (2004) p. 99. 
59 See annex A. 
60 See annex B. Henceforth 'MoU06'. 
61 MoU06, paras. 25 and 27. 
62 See annex C. Henceforth 'MoU07'. 
63 MoU07, closing page. 
64 MoU07, para. 27. 
65 MoU07, para. 2. 
66 MoU07, para. 3. 
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for the return programme laid out in the MoU and will receive direct 
monetary aid from Sweden.67 
3.2 Reactions to the MoU 
The MoU might have come as a surprise to many; it certainly did to the 
Author of this paper. All through 2006, and well into the summer of 2007, 
Afghan protests against the Norwegian government’s decision to send many 
of them back to Afghanistan dominated Norwegian refugee news.68 In the 
summer of 2007, protests spread to Sweden. Afghan asylum seekers took to 
the streets of Stockholm after it became clear that the Swedish government 
would cease to grant many of them temporary asylum.69 News coverage 
painted a picture of a determined community of asylum seekers, without any 
interest to return to a country in turmoil.  
                                                 
67 MoU07, para. 19; Swedish Government, Förordning (2007:640) om återetableringsstöd 
för vissa utlänningar (SFS 2007:640). 
68 Survey of: NOAS, News clips, <www.noas.no/?p=archive&cat_id=8>, visited on 14 June 
2008; and UNHCR, Baltic Nordic Headlines, 
<www.unhcr.se/en/News/baltic_nordic_en.html>, visited on 14 June 2008. 
69 K.V. Olsson, TT, 'Möjligt avvisa till Afghanistan', Svenska Dagbladet, 16 May 2007, 
<www.svd.se/dynamiskt/inrikes/did_15471052.asp>, visited on 18 July 2008; Executive 
rejection decision of one Afghan male with temporary residence permit: Swedish Migration 
Board (Lifos no. 16669) 
<www.migrationsverket.se/include/lifos/dokument/www/070515201.pdf>, visited on 18 
July 2008; TT, 'Sju till sjukhus efter protestmarsch', Dagens Nyheter, 1 August 2007, 
<www.dn.se/DNet/jsp/polopoly.jsp?a=676302>, visited on 14 June 2008. 
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4 Introduction of UNHCR 
This Chapter will provide a preliminary introduction to UNHCR through a 
historical description of how it functions, with whom it concerns itself and 
in what way. Basic refugee terminology used throughout the study will also 
be introduced as a part of the description of UNHCR. 
4.1 Modus operandi 
Through the adoption of Resolution 319(IV) in 1949, the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) decided to establish a High Commissioner's 
Office for Refugees as the entity principally responsible for international 
refugee issues.70 One year later, the UNHCR was created as a subsidiary 
organ to the UNGA through Resolution 428(V).71 UNHCR's Statute was 
annexed to the resolution and describes how the High Commissioner is 
supposed to function.72  
 
According to its Statute, UNHCR's work is supposed to be completely 
apolitical.73 To ensure this, and to isolate UNHCR from the politicised work 
of the UN Secretariat, it was to follow policy directives given directly by the 
UNGA and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).74 However, the 
UN Secretariat maintained important means of influence over UNHCR as it 
was given the right to nominate candidates to the post as High 
Commissioner and allocate funds from the UN budget.75 Though once 
elected by the UNGA, the High Commissioner can freely choose a Deputy 
(provided that the person is of a different nationality than herself) and staff 
within budgetary limits.76 
 
To help the High Commissioner cope more effectively with controversies 
that might arise in her work, UNHCR's Statute allows ECOSOC to establish 
an advisory committee as aide.77 Such a committee, of 15 State 
representatives, was first established in 1951 and instructed to provide the 
High Commissioner with advice upon her request.78 The Advisory 
Committee was replaced by the UN Refugee Fund Executive Committee in 
1955, which in turn was replaced with the Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner's Programme (ExCom) in 1958. The latter included 
                                                 
70 UNGA, Refugees and Stateless Persons (A/RES/319(IV)); G.S. Goodwin-Gill and J. 
McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2007) p. 
20.  
71 UNGA, 1950 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (A/RES/428(V)). 
72 Ibid., annex. Henceforth, 'UNHCR Statute'. 
73 UNHCR Statute, para. 2. 
74 UNHCR Statute, para. 3; G.S. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam, supra note 70, footnote 44. 
75 UNHCR Statute, paras. 13 and 18. 
76 UNHCR Statute, paras. 14 and 15. 
77 UNHCR Statute, para. 4. 
78 ECOSOC, Establishment of an Advisory Committee on Refugees (E/RES/393(XIII)B). 
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representatives from 24 States at the time, but has since swelled to 70 
(2007). ExCom organised itself around one annual plenary session in 1995 
and established a 'Standing Committee of the Whole' to carry on work in 
between sessions.79 
4.2 Mandate ratio personae 
Through its Statute, UNHCR is responsible for refugees as they are defined 
in the Statute: 
 
“Any [...] person who is outside the country of his nationality, or if he has no 
nationality, the country of his former habitual residence, because he has or 
had well-found fear of persecution by reason of race. religion, nationality or 
political opinion and is unable or, because of such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of the government of his country of nationality [...] 
or [...] habitual residence.”80 
 
In addition, those who have been classified as refugees by precursory 
arrangements, as far back as 1926, are also considered the responsibility of 
UNHCR.81 Persons who can receive protection from another State, who 
receive protection from another branch of the UN or has committed a crime 
contrary to the purpose and principles of the UN (such as war crimes), are 
on the other hand excluded from UNHCR's responsibility.82  
 
The definition of who is to be considered a refugee and deserving UNHCR's 
assistance requires an individual assessment. As a consequence, those who 
are part of a group too large for each member to be individually assessed are 
deprived of protection.83 Yet it was always intended that the High 
Commissioner's work should relate to groups.84 Over the years, this 
incongruence was corrected through a number of sequential steps. To begin 
with, the UNGA extended UNHCR's mandate, in 1959, to include those 
who “do not come within the competence of the United Nations”. Initially 
the mandate was only extended as far as transfer of aid was concerned, then 
in 1966, also including a right to provide protection and permanent solutions 
in general.85 Thus, UNHCR's competence today extends to all whom cross 
                                                 
79 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, supra note 70, pp. 429-30.  
80 UNHCR Statute, para. 6(B). 
81 UNHCR Statute, para. 6(A). 
82 UNHCR Statute, para. 7; UNGA, Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR] 
(A/RES/217(III)/A) Article 14; USA et al., Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment 
of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal. London, 8 August 1945, charter Article 6 
<www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/350?OpenDocument>, visited on 4 July 2008. 
83 B.S. Aga Khan, 'Lectures on Legal Problems Relating to Refugees and Displaced Persons 
Delivered at the Hague Academy of International Law, 4-6 August 1976, pp. 44-50' in B.S. 
Chimni, International Refugee Law: A reader (Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2000) p. 239.  
84 UNHCR Statute, para. 2. 
85 UNGA, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(A/RES/1399(XIV)) para 2; UNGA, Reports of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (A/RES/2039(XX)) para 1.  
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an international border fleeing persecution and man-made disasters.86 The 
broad responsibility begins with the asylum seeker as a presumptive refugee 
and extends beyond the refugees' return with a duty to provide protection 
and assistance.87 
 
At the same time as UNHCR's mandate expanded to include virtually all 
those who had fled across an international border, a more novel and 
unpredictable extension of the mandate took place. Dealing with victimised 
Sudanese in 1972, who had fled inside their own country, ECOSOC for the 
first time ever mentioned “displaced persons” as a category of concern to 
UNHCR.88 Applicability of the concept beyond specific cases was endorsed 
by the UNGA in 1975.89 In 1980 it was confirmed that both protection and 
assistance could be extended to Internally Displaced Persons (IDP).90 
However, three prerequisites need to be fulfilled in each situation before any 
steps can be taken by UNHCR on behalf of IDPs. The UN Secretary 
General (UNSG) needs to make a request, the State concerned needs to 
consent, and UNHCR's special expertise needs to be called for.91 
 
Throughout the rest of the thesis, the term 'Refugee' will be used to describe 
all those within UNHCR's mandate without distinction. The same word used 
without capitalisation should be read as referring to the original group of 
Statute Refugees. 
4.3 Mandated activities 
Through its Statute, UNHCR is tasked primarily with the duty of providing 
international protection and to seek permanent solutions for those who are 
within its mandate personae. Permanent solutions originally envisioned 
include the voluntary repatriation and assimilation of Refugees.92 
International protection include the supervision of international conventions 
for the protection of Refugees and the promotion of similar new  
instruments; conclusion of agreements with governments to improve the 
situation of Refugees and reduce their numbers; coordination of assistance 
to private Refugee aid endeavours; promotion of the admission of Refugees 
and monitoring of their situation.93  
                                                 
86 V. Türk, 'The Role of UNHCR in the Development of International Refugee Law', in F. 
Nicholson and P. Twomey (eds.), Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International 
Concepts and Regimes (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999) p. 156; UNGA, 
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (A/RES/31/35) para. 1. 
87 Türk, supra note 86, pp. 157-58. 
88 ECOSOC, Assistance in the Relief, Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Sudanese Refugees 
(E/RES/1655(LII)) preamble. 
89 Aga Khan, supra note 83, p. 242; UNGA, Report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (A/RES/3454(XXX)) preamble. 
90 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, supra note 70, p. 29; UNGA, Report of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (A/RES/35/41/A) para. 1; For a different opinion about 
the definitive year, see: Türk, supra note 86, p. 159. 
91 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, supra note 70, p. 33; Türk, supra note 86, p. 159. 
92 UNHCR Statute, para. 1. 
93 UNHCR Statute, para. 2. 
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Among the solutions that UNHCR is mandated to strive for, repatriation 
may be the hardest to grasp fully. 'Repatriation' is the voluntary return of a 
Refugee to his or her country of origin. UNHCR is supposed to do its best to 
make sure that Refugees can, and want to, take this step voluntarily.94 
 
When it comes to the protection aspect of UNHCR's mandate, there are 
several things that need to be pointed out already at this stage. The duty to 
supervise international conventions for Refugee protection will be 
considered first, followed by the increasingly operational character of 
UNHCR's work. 
 
Many of the instruments that UNHCR was to supervise did not exist at the 
creation of the Organisation, though the same year as the first High 
Commissioner took up office in 1951 the instrument that would become the 
legal backbone of refugee protection was adopted.95 The 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees was ratified by the first State in 1952, and 
entered into force two years later.96 Among other things, it binds the 
participating States to respect the same refugee definition as the one 
contained in UNHCR's Statute, though limited in time and space to those 
who had fled because of the Second World War in Europe.97 The 1951 
Convention also created a legal obligation for the contracting States to 
cooperate with the High Commissioner in her work for Refugees, in 
particular the High Commissioners supervision of the 1951 Convention, 
through inter alia the sharing of information relating to Refugees.98  
 
The second instrument which was brought into existence to be monitored by 
UNHCR, was by large an extension of the 1951 Convention. This was the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees which removed the 
differences between the definition contained in UNHCR's Statute and that 
which legally bind States.99 The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
will be mostly referred to as one throughout this thesis under the term 
'Refugee Convention'. 
 
Beyond legal advocacy and intervention activities there was not much room 
for protection activity on behalf of UNHCR initially. Commentators note 
that the disbandment of the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) was 
supposed to mean the end to large-scale assistance efforts to Refugees on 
                                                 
94 UNHCR Statute, para. 1. Others have noted that there is an inherent paradox in working 
to protect the right to be a refugee while at the same time working towards ending this 
status: Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, supra note 70, p. 492. 
95 P. Collins, A Mandate to Protect and Assist Refugees: 20 Years of Service in the Cause of 
Refugees 1951–1971 (Editions Rencontre, Lausanne, 1971) p. 131. 
96 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees [1951 Convention](189 UNTS 150). 
97 Ibid., Article 1. 
98 1951 Convention, para. 35. 
99 Nevertheless, States who were already members of the 1951 Convention, and had made 
explicit declarations to that extent could maintain the temporal and geographical 
limitations: 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (606 UNTS 267) Articles 1 
and 7(4). 
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behalf of the international community.100 Moreover, judging by the Statute 
as well as operations before any changes to the Mandate, UNHCR was not 
envisioned as a highly operative organisation.101 Budgetary means was only 
provided for administrative expenses, and involvement with the welfare of 
Refugees included only assistance to coordinate efforts made by others.102 
As a bleak remnant of IRO's capacity to provide both legal and material 
assistance to those under its responsibility,103 only one clause remained that 
allowed UNHCR to funnel voluntary donations to public or private entities 
for assistance purposes.104 However UNHCR's mandate was broadened 
when States realised that the plight of refugees might require material 
humanitarian assistance after all. UNHCR was authorised to operate 
programmes as a first step,105 and eventually the ban on appeals for 
voluntary contributions from States was dropped.106 This paved the way for 
UNHCR as the key provider of legal as well as material safety to those 
many who were left without protection by their respective States. 
 
Throughout the thesis, the word 'Mandate' refers to UNHCR's responsibility, 
through its Statute; UNGA Resolutions; ExCom Conclusions and the 
Refugee Convention, for the protection and material assistance of Refugees. 
                                                 
100 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, supra note 70, p. 20. 
101 P.D. Maynard, 'The Legal Competence of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees', 31 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1982) p. 423; P. Collins, 
supra note 95, pp. 13, 17 and 35. 
102 UNHCR Statute, paras. 20 and 8(i). 
103 Constitution of the International Refugee Organization and Agreement on interim 
measures to be taken in respect of refugees and displaced persons. Opened for signature on 
15 December 1946 (18 UNTS 3) Articles 1 and 2. 
104 UNHCR Statute, para. 10. 
105 In 1954 according to Aga Khan, supra note 83, p. 243; But in 1955 according to UNGA, 
International Assistance to Refugees Within the Mandate of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (A/RES/832(IX)) preamble and para. 2. 
106 In 1958: UNGA, International Assistance to Refugees Within the Mandate of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (A/RES/1166(XII)) para. 1(b). 
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5 UNHCR’s status under 
international law 
Any effort towards an evaluation of UNHCR's behaviour requires 
knowledge of its status under international law. Its status will determine 
which acts can be legally carried out and whether responsibility can be 
demanded for actions taken. Hence, this Chapter will clarify UNHCR's 
status under international law.  
 
The assumption is that UNHCR, in addition to being a subsidiary organ of 
the UNGA, is an international organisation.107 In the absence of a 
universally accepted definition of what constitutes an international 
organisation, the task of classifying UNHCR may appear difficult at best.108 
But even scholars who claim that it is “structurally impossible” to construct 
a set of criteria by which one can determine whether something is an 
international organisation or not, acknowledge the existence of useful 
indicators to that end.109 What is more, there seems to be a general 
consensus on at least some of these indicators. 
5.1 The indicators of an international 
organisation 
The most uncontroversial indicator is that an international organisation 
requires its members to be either States or other international 
organisations.110 In relation to this criterion, it is noted that the International 
Law Commission's (ILC) most recent draft articles relating to international 
organisations exclude organisations without any States as members. Given 
that the commentaries to the draft articles explicitly mention the existence of 
international organisations without State members, this should not be taken 
as non-recognition of such organisations.111 The omission is likely due to 
the special focus of the draft articles on international responsibility.112 
 
A second requirement is that the entity has a goal, or will, separate from 
those of its individual members.113 This need not always be practically so, 
                                                 
107 Personality is pragmatically assumed in international law and rebutted with enough 
evidence: J. Klabbers, An introduction to International Institutional Law (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2002) p. 57. 
108 H.G. Schermers and N.M. Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity Within 
diversity (Kluwer Law International, the Hague, 1995) p. 22. 
109 Klabbers, supra note 107, pp. 7-8. 
110 P. Sands and P. Klein, Bowett's Law of International Institutions (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2001) p. 278; Klabbers, supra note 107, pp. 9-10. 
111 ILC, Report of the International Law Commission (A/58/10(SUPP)) pp. 38 and 44.  
112 ILC, First Report on Responsibility of International Organisations (A/CN.4/532) para. 
15. 
113 Sands and Klein, supra note 110, p. 16. 
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but that it is legally true remains a prerequisite.114 According to ILC, 
international legal personality is necessary to fulfil this criterion, but little 
guidance is offered on how to proceed with that determination.115 But ever 
since 1949, and the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) Reparations for 
Injuries advisory opinion, it is known that entities other than States are able 
to posses legal personality.116 Established theory among scholars, supported 
by the ICJ, presents two theories to determine legal personality. Either it is 
apparent from the statute of the entity in question that it has been conferred 
with legal personality, or the same can be inferred from the tasks the entity 
has been obligated to fulfil. In order to be able to conclude treaties, for 
example, the entity would have to possess legal personality for that 
purpose.117 Some scholars make the reservation that unless an intention of 
the entity's creators to imbue it with legal personality can be determined, no 
such capacity can exist.118 ILC added the weight of its authority to dispute 
this theory when it explained that the ICJ has tended not to emphasise intent 
when determining the existence of legal personality.119 
 
A third, more disputed quality of an international organisation is the manner 
in which it was created. Some scholars deny all entities status as 
international organisations except those who have been created through a 
treaty.120 Others go as far as to say that uniform practice over a period of 
time is sufficient for the creation of an international organisation.121 This 
seems less far-fetched considering how the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) came into existence. It gradually grew forth 
through its members' practice, despite an initial agreement that it would not 
constitute an international organisation.122 There are also several examples 
of organisations that have been created through resolutions, both by the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and other organisations.123 Seeing 
                                                 
114 Regarding the difficulty for an international organisation to pursue goals other than 
those of its members, see Schermers and Blokker, supra note 108, p. 30. 
115 ILC, supra note 111, pp. 41-42. 
116 ICJ, 'Advisory Opinion on Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United 
Nations', 3 United Nations International Court of Justice Yearbook (1948-1949) p. 67. 
117 Sands and Klein, supra note 110, pp. 471-72; D. Akande, 'International Organizations', 
in M.D. Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2006) pp. 
281-82. 
118 Akande, supra note 117, p. 282. 
119 ILC, supra note 111, pp. 41-42. 
120 Sands and Klein, supra note 110, p. 16. 
121 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2003) p. 650. 
122 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 108, p. 21.  
123 For example, UNMIK, created through Security Council Resolution 1244, has the 
capacity to conclude treaties: B. Knoll, 'From Benchmarking or Final Status? Kosovo and 
the Problem of an International Administration's Open-Ended Mandate', 16 European 
Journal of International Law (2005) p. 644;  
 Examples of other international organisations created through resolutions: 
Klabbers, supra note 107, footnote 35; D.J. Bederman, 'The Souls of International 
Organizations: Legal Personality and the Lighthouse at Cape Spartel', 36 Virginia Journal 
of International Law (1996) footnote 404: W.S. Penfield, 'The Legal Status of the Pan 
American Union', 20 American Journal of International Law (1926) and J. Basdevant, 'La 
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as how this is the case, claims that international organisations can be created 
by means other than treaties appear justified. The common criterion seems 
to be that an organisation is created through an act governed by international 
law.124 
5.2 Evaluation of UNHCR against the 
indicators 
As the means to determine whether UNHCR is an international organisation 
are mere persuasive indicators, compliance with each one of them does not 
establish with full certainty the status of UNHCR. The opposite is also true. 
Less than full compliance in some aspect can still mean that UNHCR is an 
international organisation. This gives an admittedly speculative air to the 
research, but absent a verdict by the ICJ on the status of UNHCR, a 
determination based on the totality of circumstances is the best solution 
available. 
5.2.1 Members 
To begin with, there is no doubt that UNHCR's members are States. The 
question is rather which ones. As UNHCR was created by a UNGA 
resolution, it is tempting to stop at that and conclude that the two bodies 
must share the same members. However, things are not that simple. As 
previously described, the UNGA ceded part of its control over UNHCR to 
the much smaller ECOSOC already at the time of UNHCR's creation.125 
Consequently, States who are not members of ECOSOC enjoy less 
knowledge and control over UNHCR's activities. ECOSOC in turn has 
ceded part of its control to ExCom.126 Thus it can be said that only members 
of the ExCom full control and insight in UNHCR's activities. This limit the 
absolute members of UNHCR to 70, compared to the 192 members of the 
UN.127 It sets UNHCR somewhat aside from the UN in terms of effective 
membership, even though it should be acknowledged that UNHCR lacks its 
own rules of membership. However, that UNHCR was to operate with 
separate membership from the UN in general is further emphasised by the 
original reason for the establishment of a type of executive committee -- to 
facilitate the participation of non UN members.128 
                                                                                                                            
Conference de Rio-de-Janaeiro de 1906', 15 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 
(1908). 
124 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 108, pp. 23-24; Klabbers, supra note 107, p. 11. 
125 Power ceded from UNGA to ECOSOC see at supra note 74; Members number 54 States 
as of 2008: Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, supra note 70, p. 282; ECOSOC, ECOSOC 
members, <www.un.org/ecosoc/about/members.shtml>, visited on 8 July 2008. 
126 See Chapter 4.1 and for further details see Chapter 8.1. 
127 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, supra note 70, p. 741; UN, Press Release (ORG/1469) 
<www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/org1469.doc.htm>, visited on 8 July 2008. 
128 M. Zieck, 'Vanishing Points of the Refugee Law Regime: Response to James Hathaway', 
20 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution (2005) footnote 108. 
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5.2.2 Separate will 
To determine whether UNHCR has a will separate from that of its 
individual members, the question of legal personality has to be addressed. 
Though there is no paragraph in the Statute which explicitly states that 
UNHCR is to enjoy international legal personality, it can be inferred from 
the tasks that it is charged to carry out. The duty to protect Refugees is a 
prime example. As a surrogate for something typically provided to 
individuals by a State, this duty is indicative of legal personality.129 Included 
in the concept of protection are interventions on behalf of individual 
Refugees threatened with refoulement, supervision of Refugees' access to 
asylum procedures and issuance of travel documents. Neither of these tasks 
would be possible without legal personality.130 According to the ICJ, this is 
sufficient to establish the existence of international legal personality for an 
entity.131 In addition, UNHCR carries responsibility for the supervision of 
treaties concluded for the protection of refugees.132 States who are members 
to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees or the 1967 Protocol, 
have given their explicit recognition of UNHCR's capacity in this regard.133 
And as a matter of law it would be impossible for UNHCR to effectively 
undertake this task unless it enjoys a separate legal personality from those 
whom it is to supervise.134 
5.2.3 Constituent instruments 
The third indicator which needs testing is that an international organisation 
has to be created through an act governed by international law. UNHCR was 
created through a resolution by the UNGA. Such resolutions are often 
considered as mere political acts. Yet they have to conform to the UN 
Charter, which undoubtedly is a legal document establishing the UN as an 
international organisation in the most traditional of ways between States. 
The Charter regulates the operation of the UN, in particular its right to 
create subsidiary organs.135 Thus, the creation of UNHCR is undoubtedly an 
act governed by international law. 
5.2.4 Conclusion 
Since UNHCR does not fulfil the three indicators established for 
determination of its status as an international organisation to the fullest, 
some uncertainty could remain regarding its status. To the sceptic it might 
seem as UNHCR's close ties to the UN would bar it from separate 
                                                 
129 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, supra note 70, pp. 9-10. 
130 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, supra note 70, pp. 447 and 432. 
131 ICJ, supra note 116, p. 180. 
132 UNHCR Statute, para. 8(a). 
133 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (189 UNTS 150) para. 35; 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (606 UNTS 267) Article 2. 
134 R. Wilde, 'Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: Why and How UNHCR Governance of 
“Development” Refugee Camps Should Be Subject To International Human Rights Law', 1 
Yale Human Rights and development Law Journal (1998) p. 114. 
135 UN Charter, Article 22. 
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recognition as an international organisation. Nevertheless, considering that 
other subsidiary organs such as United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD)136 are regarded, by some of the most influential 
scholars, as international organisations, any doubts regarding UNHCR 
status should be dispelled.137 Unlike UNHCR, the secretariat of UNCTAD 
is not formally separated from that of the UN.138 And while UNCTAD 
shares its entire budget with the parent organisation,139 the larger part of 
UNHCR's budget is its own.140 UNHCR also chooses its own staff and 
appoints representatives around the world who answer only to the High 
Commissioner, though the same terms of employment as the UN in general 
are used.141 Both UNHCR and UNCTAD have offices separate from that of 
the UN in New York.142 It could be further argued that UNHCR's clearly 
stipulated duty to report to the UNGA about its operations every year would 
tie it closer to the UN.143 What this does not fully consider is that UNCTAD 
also produces reports to the UNGA with some regularity.144 That they are 
not dealt with as separate agenda items does not have to be interpreted as a 
lesser desire on behalf of the UNGA to exert control. It could just as well be 
that the need to repeatedly offer support to its activities is less than in 
relation to UNHCR. The UN regularly lends its persuasive authority to 
activities carried out by its organs as well as clearly separate 
organisations.145  
 
Though UNHCR is undoubtedly subject to somewhat greater political 
control from the UN than UNCTAD, this is countered by greater 
responsibilities, more extensive institutional machinery and independent 
control over larger resources.146 All of these circumstances warrants the 
                                                 
136 UNCTAD include all States members of UN as members: UNGA, Establishment of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development as an Organ of the General 
Assembly (A/RES/1995(XIX)) section II, para. (1). 
137 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 108, p. 26.  
138 UNGA, supra note 136, section II, para. 26. 
139 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 108, p. 26. 
140 This is a necessary implication based on the fact that ExCom budgeted USD 1,058 
million for 2007, out of which regular UN budget contributions amounted to USD 34 
million: UNGA, Report of the Executive Committee of the Programme of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Fifty-eighth session (1-5 October 2007) 
(A/62/12/Add.1) para. 16(e). 
141 UNHCR Statute, paras. 15(a)-(c), 16. 
142 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 108, p. 26; UNHCR Statute, para. 19. 
143 UNHCR Statute, para. 11. 
144 UNGA, supra note 136, section II, para. 25(l); examples of UNCTAD reports: Activity 
Report 2007 (UNCTAD/DITC/2008/1), ECESA Trade Cluster Annual Report 2006: Work 
Progress and Challenges Ahead (UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2007/1), Challenges and 
opportunities for developing countries in producing biofuels 
(UNCTAD/DITC/COM/2006/15). 
145 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 108, p. 28. 
146 UNHCR is responsible for some 32.9 million individuals, a staff of some 6,200 people 
around the globe, and manages a budget separate from the UN at approximately USD 1 
billion: supra note 140; UNHCR, Protecting Refugees and the Role of UNHCR (UNHCR, 
Geneva, 2007) pp. 28 and 30.  
UNCTAD, according to its webpage, has a staff of 400 people and operates 
with a budget of USD 75 million: Online resource, 
<www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1931&lang=1>, visited on 9 July 2008. 
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final conclusion that UNHCR, in addition to being a subsidiary organ of the 
UN, is an international organisation with some separate degree of legal 
personality.147 
                                                 
147 On the existence of intermediates between international organisations and organs: see 
Schermers and Blokker, supra note 108, p. 28. 
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6 The MoU 
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is easy to describe in non-legal 
terminology. It is a document that contains a text and bears three different 
signatures. To determine the exact legal meaning of the text and signatures, 
on the other hand, takes more of an effort but is necessary none the less for 
an understanding of its significance in relation to UNHCR's involvement. 
6.1 International agreement 
The MoU bears insignia that all would recognise as typical for an agreement 
through a basic textual analysis. It contains language outlining a common 
understanding and signatures to confirm this.148 Without more closely 
specifying the normative nature of the agreement at this point, it is further 
possible to conclude that it must be an international agreement. This is a 
logic consequence of two facts. To begin with, the agreement was created 
through the involvement of international actors. No doubt can exist that 
States are international actors, as the very notion of international law rests 
on the presumption that they posses that quality.149 As for UNHCR, its 
international legal personality was established in the previous Chapter. 
Secondly, the agreement was created to function within the international 
sphere. This is proven by the subject matter of the agreement, which 
undoubtedly concerns inter state relations beyond the scope of private 
actors.150 Because, it would make no more sense for a State to agree with 
itself to readmit its nationals, than it would to agree upon that with a private 
entity.151 
6.2 Normative system 
That an agreement creates some kind of relationship between those involved 
is self evident and inherent in the English language itself. What kind of 
relationship, on the other hand, is far from undisputed. The most rigid, and 
perhaps most meaningful, form of agreement creates binding rights and 
obligations. Hence it would make sense to attempt to determine if the 
present agreement belongs to that category. But what it means to create 
binding rights and obligations is not clear either, because the meaning of the 
word 'binding' depends on a normative context that must first be established. 
 
While some scholars, like Kelvin Widdows, seem to take for granted that a 
binding international agreement equals a treaty, which is governed by 
                                                 
148 Especially: MoU, paras. 2, 25 and closing page. 
149 States are the original sources of customary law as well as treaty law: M.N. Shaw, 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) pp. 65-103 and 107-15. 
150 As is the case with treaties: Brownlie, supra note 121, p. 581. 
151 MoU07, para. 4. 
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international law per definition,152 others claim that there is a distinction to 
be made between binding legal, political and moral agreements.153 The latter 
assertion, which would force a categorisation of the MoU into one of three 
normative systems before any conclusion could be made regarding its 
binding nature, is disputed by Jan Klabbers. He claims, in a well-received 
work published in 1996,154 that “agreements are either legally binding, or 
not binding at all”.155 Klabbers builds his thesis on five problems that the 
notion of non-legally binding agreements faces.156 Some of these merit more 
attention than others. To begin with, Klabbers point to the fact that a method 
to resolve conflicts among a multitude of normative systems would be 
needed, but is lacking.157 He then goes on to observe that there is a lack of 
judicial as well as customary support for normative regimes other than the 
legal.158 However, his most convincing argument is perhaps the assertion 
that intentional creation of morally and politically binding agreements is 
theoretically impossible.159 Morally binding agreements cannot be a sound 
construct for at least one of two reasons. One, because of a lack of 
correlation between moral rights and obligations, as the latter can be 
fulfilled without the moral rights being honoured.160 Or, because morality is 
something that crystallises over time, from judgement passed on a number 
of acts, which renders instant creation of moral obligations impossible.161 
Politically binding agreements as an idea is flawed because law is inherently 
political and widely accepted as the normative order which facilitates 
politics. Also, when it proves impossible to create any kind of an agreement 
without being politically bound, it is irrelevant to discuss politics as a 
separate normative order.162 
 
If one accept Klabbers' thesis as sound, it is possible to act according to the 
same assumption that Kelvin Widdows would make. That is, if the MoU is 
an internationally binding agreement, it also has to be an international legal 
agreement. Thus, it is possible to make use of rules in international law 
relating to binding international legal agreements, to ascertain whether the 
MoU is binding upon those involved. 
                                                 
152 K. Widdows, 'What is an Agreement in International Law?*', 50 British Year Book of 
International Law (1979) pp. 117-49. 
153 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, New York, 
2007) pp. 20-21.  
154 I. Sinclair, 'Book Review and Note: The Concept of Treaty in International Law. By Jan 
Klabbers. The Hauge, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1996. pp. XX, 302. 
Index. F1 165; $110; £74.25', 91 American Journal of International Law (1997) p. 748. 
155 J. Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law (Kluwer Law International, 
Hauge, 1996) p. 217 (emphasis added by the author). 
156 Ibid., p. 121. 
157 Ibid., p. 138. 
158 Ibid., pp. 123-28, 146-47, 216.  
159 Ibid., p. 122. 
160 Ibid., p. 149. 
161 Ibid., pp. 150-51. 
162 Ibid., pp. 154-55. 
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6.3 Treaty law 
Rules relating to binding international legal agreements exist primarily 
through customary law, where such agreements in general are referred to as 
“treaties”. However, these rules have also been formalised through written 
accord.163 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT69), 
adopted in 1969, defines a treaty as: 
 
[...] an international agreement concluded between States in written form 
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its 
particular designation;164 
 
Through the definition of a treaty (and elsewhere) the Vienna Convention of 
1969 excludes international agreements concluded between States and 
international organisations from its scope.165 However, that should not be 
taken as a rejection of their validity as the Convention does not aspire to be 
an exhaustive definition of what a treaty is.166 Nor is there a lack of 
customary acceptance of treaties that involve international organisations as 
parties.167 This was even explicitly recognised in 1986 when the Vienna 
Convention on Treaties Between States and International Organizations 
was opened for signature.168 It still awaits its thirty-fifth signature by a 
State, which is needed for it to enter into force, but is considered applicable 
law none the less.169 Hence, the MoU is not necessarily barred from status 
as a Treaty due to an international organisation's participation.  
 
It has already been concluded in Chapter 6.1 above in a manner that 
conforms with the test to which one would subject a potential treaty, that the 
MoU is an international agreement.170 Thus, the one criterion which remains 
to be fulfilled is that it should be “governed by international law”. Although 
unnecessarily ambiguous, the phrase reveals, after a reading of the 1969 
Vienna Convention's drafting history, that a treaty has to create legal 
obligations between the parties to be regarded as such.171 Whether the MoU 
does that, is dependent on the intent of the Parties,172 which can only be 
ascertained through an examination of all the MoU's actual terms and the 
                                                 
163 Aust, supra note 153, p. 6; Shaw, supra note 149, p. 811. 
164 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [VCLT69] (1155 UNTS 331) Article 2(1)a.  
165 VCLT69, Articles 2 and 3.  
166 VCLT69, Article 3. 
167 Aust, supra note 153, pp. 392-93. 
168 Vienna Convention on Treaties Between States and International Organizations or 
International Organizations [VCLT86] (A/CONF.129/15). 
169 UN Treaty Collection Online, Vienna Convention on Treaties Between States and 
International Organizations or International Organizations, 
<untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXXIII/treaty3.asp>, 
visited on 22 March 2008; M. Fitzmaurice, 'The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties', 
in M.D. Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2006) p. 189. 
170 Aust, supra note 153, pp. 17-20. 
171 K. Widdows, 'What is an Agreement In International Law?', 50 British Yearbook of 
International Law (1979) pp. 126-36. 
172 Ibid., p. 121. 
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circumstances surrounding its creation.173 Interpretation of its terms should 
be based primarily on their natural meaning in the context in which the 
MoU was created and in the light of its object and purpose. Any expression 
of intent recognised by all the Parties, such as preambles or annexes, and 
any relevant international law applicable between them, constitute the 
context.174 Widely used supplementary means of interpretation include 
preparatory works and circumstances, other than those that constitute the 
context, surrounding the MoU's conclusion.175 
6.3.1 Contextual interpretation of the treaty 
Many paragraphs of the MoU state that one or both Parties 'will' act in 
certain ways. “The Parties will take special measures”, “[...] Sweden will 
[...] meet the costs of Afghans covered by this MoU”, and “Afghanistan will 
inform UNHCR about any case of arrest, detention and penal proceedings”. 
The usage of the word 'will' has to be interpreted as a serious, and binding, 
wording in most of its occurrences. Whereas Widdows would agree with 
this statement, Aust believes that the stronger word 'shall' is the preferred 
terminology when States intend to bind themselves legally.176 Though the 
latter is possible, but disputed, the natural meaning of the phrase 'I will' is 
hardly interpreted by most people as anything other than an absolute 
commitment. It is also equally true that many less committing phrases could 
have been used, for example, 'with an aim to', 'shall attempt to', or 'to their 
best capacity'. 
 
That the Parties agree to solve any dispute through consultations between 
themselves is ambiguous.177 It could be interpreted as proof of the intent not 
to be legally bound since it aims to avoid that disputes are brought before, 
and adjudicated by, a competent legal authority such as the ICJ. However, 
the paragraph is worded as a commitment not to seek adjudication of 
disputes, rather than a statement to the effect that the MoU is unfit for 
adjudication. This also provides a good explanation why neither of the 
Parties has registered the MoU with the UNSG. A registration is not only an 
indication that the Parties consider it a treaty,178 but a prerequisite for 
dispute settlement through adjudication within the UN system.179 As such it 
would naturally appear unfriendly in light of the commitment to solve any 
dispute through dialogue. This effectively counters the assumption, that 
unregistered documents are not legally binding, which would otherwise 
                                                 
173 Shaw, supra note 149, p. 814. 
174 VCLT69, Article 31; Shaw, supra note 149, p. 840. 
175 VCLT69, Article 32. 
176 Widdows, supra note 171, p. 137; Aust, supra note 153, p. 33. 
177 MoU07, para. 24. 
178 According to Article 102.1 of the UN Charter members of the organisation have a duty 
to register treaties they enter into, as soon as possible, with the Secretariat: 'Charter of the 
United Nations' [UN Charter] in G. Melander et al., The Raoul Wallenberg Institute 
Compilation of Human Rights Instruments (Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2004) p. 653 
179 Widdows, supra note 171, p. 143; Aust, supra note 153, p. 36; UN Charter, Article 
102(2). 
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prevail.180 Beyond that, registration does not affect the status of the MoU.181 
Quite opposite to what Aust seems to believe, registration in the Treaty 
Series by the UN secretariat does not entail any value judgement at all on its 
behalf.182 
 
Examination of other instruments that the Parties have chosen to register 
with the UNSG strengthens the view that the words used in the present MoU 
are considered by them as conferrers of legal obligations. Similar 
terminology is used in a 'memorandum of understanding' between Sweden 
and Hungary, as well as in a 'letter of understanding' between UNHCR and 
Jordan.183 
6.4 Conclusion 
As a final remark, it can be said that one would have to agree with Widdows 
that States who choose to make use of the form of written agreement should 
be presumed to have intended to create a legal bond between themselves, 
and that they have an obligation to make any other intent apparent.184 
Although all formalities concerning the creation of a treaty have not been 
adhered to in relation to the MoU, acceptance of more informal legally 
binding instruments have a long history.185 Based on all the facts at hand the 
conclusion must be that the MoU should be regarded as creating legal rights 
and obligations between the Parties. 
                                                 
180 Widdows, supra note 171, p. 144. 
181 ICJ, 'Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar 
and Bahrain', 87 International Court of Justice (1994) p. 14. 
182 Aust, supra note 153, pp. 26 and 51; UN, Statement of Treaties and International 
Agreements: Registered or Filed and Recorded With the Secretariat During the Month of 
November 2004 (ST/LEG/SER.A/693) p. 5. 
183 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden 
and the Government of the Republic of Hungary on Defence Industrial Co-operation and 
Exchange of Views Concerning Certain Defence Matters (2087 UNTS 324); Letter of 
Understanding Between the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2222 UNTS 213). 
184 Widdows, supra note 171, p. 139. 
185 According to Lauterpacht, acting in the capacity of Special Rapporteur on Treaties, there 
was acceptance of more informal instruments already in 1952: Widdows, supra note 171, p. 
127 footnote 2.  
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7 Can UNHCR legally conclude 
‘a’ treaty? 
The mere existence of international legal personality is not enough for an 
international organisation to claim that it can conclude treaties. Unlike 
States, which automatically enjoy complete international legal personality, 
international organisations are ruled by the principle of speciality.186 This 
means that only powers which are explicitly given the organisation, or 
necessary for fulfilment of its mandate, can be claimed.187 The answer to 
whether an organisation has been given such powers must be sought in the 
organisation's constituent instruments.188 
 
As with treaties, the rules in VCLT69 can be used for interpretation of 
constituent instruments.189 However, formal use of said rules is prevented 
by the fact that UNHCR's Statute was established through a UNGA 
resolution before the adoption of VCLT69. But in light of the common use 
of VCLT69 for interpretation of UNSC resolutions by scholars and other 
international organs, analogous use of the principles contained in VCLT69 
should be possible.190 
 
The point of departure, in determining UNHCR's mandate, is a context 
interpretation of the natural meaning of the Statute. Paragraph 8(a) in 
UNHCR's statute explicitly gives the Organisation a role to play in relation 
to international conventions, though it is uncertain how far this role extends. 
To 'promote' the conclusion of conventions can mean anything from 'urge' 
the adoption of, to 'help' to establish.191 Since the paragraph also allows 
UNHCR to propose amendments to conventions, the more active of the two 
roles must be presumed to have been the intended. Proposing amendments 
would naturally include drafting of such amendments, which would 
naturally extend to drafting of whole treaties. States' later acquiescence of 
UNHCR's “instrumental” role in the drafting of the 1967 Protocol confirms 
                                                 
186 Shaw, supra note 149, p. 1195. 
187 Brownlie, supra note 121, p. 581. 
188 Klabbers, supra note 107, p. 46. 
189 VCLT69, Article 5. 
190 Theoretical arguments for application of principles contained in VCLT69 for 
interpretation of UNSC resolutions can be found in E. Papastavridis, 'Interpretation of 
Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII in the aftermath of the Iraqi crisis', 56 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly (2007) pp. 99, 100-06 and 118;  
 UNCC use of VCLT69 for interpretation of UNSC resolutions, and ICTY 
use of VCLT69 for interpretation of sui generis instruments can be found in D.D. Caron, 
'The United Nations Compensation Commission for Claims Arising Out Of the Gulf War: 
The "Arising Prior To" Decision', 14 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy (2005) pp. 
327-28 and footnote 101. 
191 The definition of "promote" can be found in The American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language (Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004) 
<dictionary.reference.com/browse/promote>, visited on 10 July 2008. 
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the view that the Organisation is indeed competent to actively help in the 
establishment of international agreements.192  
 
Paragraph 8(a) does not go so far as to allow UNHCR to become party to 
treaties, but the active role it mandates UNHCR to play in the creation of 
these instruments forms part of the context in which other paragraphs will 
have to be understood, Paragraph 8(b) in particular. This Paragraph clearly 
allows UNHCR to be a party to 'special agreements'. The difference in 
terminology indicates that Paragraph 8(b) does not refer to the same kind of 
instruments as Paragraph 8(a), but does not in itself say anything about their 
status under international law. Since 'agreement' is commonly used to 
describe binding international instruments in much the same way as 'treaty' 
and 'convention' are, it could be that some capacity to enter into 
international binding agreements was intended in Paragraph 8(b),193 even if 
the multilateral law-making agreements in Paragraph 8(a) was not the 
intended. However, the text of the resolution by which the Statute was 
adopted, which is the closest thing to a preamble that there is, does not 
reveal anything further about Paragraph 8(b).194 
 
To better understand Paragraph 8(a), recourse can be had to an interpretation 
in light of the Organisation's object, purpose and practice.195 As the primary 
object and purpose of UNHCR is to provide international protection to those 
within its mandate, the claim of a capacity to conclude binding international 
agreements is strengthened.196 For in much the same way as States feel the 
need to conclude treaties to protect their citizen, so must UNHCR have a 
right to act in accordance with the sovereign function of providing 
protection that it assumes in relation to Refugees.197 The intention of those 
who drafted UNHCR's Statute, that the Organisation would enjoy 
“tremendous authority” also support that some kind of treaty making 
capacity was intended.198 Furthermore, UNHCR has been concluding 
internationally binding headquarters agreements for years and State 
acceptance of, nay participation in, these agreements acts as ample evidence 
                                                 
192 Türk, supra note 86, pp. 161-62; 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (606 
UNTS 267). 
193 Shaw, supra note 149, p. 88. 
194 Just like the preamble of a treaty, it expresses the aggregate will of those adopting the 
constituent instrument itself: UNGA, supra note 71. 
195 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, supra note 70, p. 1194-95; ICJ, 'Legality of the Use by a 
State of Nuclear Weapons In Armed Conflict', ICJ Reports (1996) pp. 66, 74-75. Klabbers 
cautions careful usage of the teleological method of textual interpretation: J. Klabbers, 
supra note 107, p. 96-100. 
196 G. Gilbert, 'Right, Legitimate Expectations, Needs and Responsibilities: UNHCR and 
the New World Order', 10 International Journal of Refugee Law (1998) p. 355.  
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Wilde, supra note 134, p. 128. 
198 C. Lewis, 'UNHCR's Contribution to the Development of International Refugee Law: Its 
Foundations and Evolution', 17 International Journal of Refugee Law (2005) p. 75. 
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that UNHCR has the capacity to conclude binding international 
agreements.199  
  
To dispel any uncertainty regarding the textual interpretation of UNHCR's 
capacity to conclude treaties, subsidiary means of interpretation can be used 
as a supplement. Hopefully they should support the same interpretation of 
'special agreements' as above. The Secretary Generals' report on the creation 
of UNHCR constitutes a part of the travaux préparatoires to the Statute. In 
that capacity it is a typical subsidiary means of interpretation. As examples 
of 'special agreements', the report uses “resettlement agreements”, 
“agreements with governments willing to receive Refugees”, and 
agreements concerning the domestic status of UNHCR and its offices.200 
Agreements concerning the establishment of national offices are typically of 
a “contractual character, creating rights and obligations”.201 And rules 
regarding immunities frequently contained therein are clearly belonging to 
the sphere of international law.202 Thus, a capacity to conclude some form of 
binding international agreements seems to have been envisioned. 
7.1 Conclusion 
As explained in this Chapter, UNHCR's treaty making capacity is beyond 
doubt. It is confirmed both by a textual interpretation of its Statute and an 
examination of the travaux préparatoires. 
                                                 
199 Headquarters agreements are treaty like instruments: D.B. Hollis, 'Why State Consent 
Still Matters: Non State Actors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources of Law' 23 Berkeley 
Journal of International Law (2005) p. 163;  
 J. McDowell, 'The International Committee of the Red Cross as a Witness 
Before International Criminal Tribunals', 1 Chinese Journal of International Law (2002) p. 
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200 Lewis, supra note 198, pp. 71-72.  
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202 Klabbers, supra note 107, p. 146; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, supra note 70, p. 1205. 
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8 Can UNHCR conclude ‘this’ 
treaty? 
It is one thing to establish that UNHCR can participate in the conclusion of 
binding legal agreements, and another to say that it is allowed to participate 
in the specific agreement at hand. The former is dependent on UNHCR's 
legal status in international law, while the latter relates to internal rules 
regulating the operation of UNHCR.203 This Chapter will attempt to 
determine whether UNHCR's conclusion of the MoU was in compliance 
with internal rules. 
8.1 Internal rules 
To determine what the internal rules are and who provides them, one should 
look to UNHCR's Statute and institutional practice.204 According to the 
Statute, UNHCR is to follow orders given by the UNGA as well as 
ECOSOC. This is a potential source of confusion since neither UNGA 
“policy directives”, nor those of ECOSOC enjoy any clear hierarchical 
primacy in UNHCR's Statute.205 In the eventuality that the two institutions 
would issue conflicting directives, which one should UNHCR follow?  
 
In Chapter 5.2.4 it was concluded that UNHCR can operate as an 
international organisation in relation to States. However, in its relations with 
the UNGA and ECOSOC, UNHCR is best understood as a subsidiary organ. 
In that capacity UNHCR should regard policy directives from the UNGA as 
superior to those from ECOSOC.206 While both are established as principal 
organs, there are many rules in the UN Charter, which places one before the 
other in importance.207 For one, the UNGA has the power to elect 
ECOSOC's members.208 Furthermore, the UNGA also has to review many 
of the decisions that ECOSOC can take that would have external effects.209 
Finally, ECOSOC has a duty to perform tasks which the UNGA might 
assign to it.210 Together these rules clearly establish that the UNGA is 
superior to ECOSOC. Hence, UNHCR should follow policy directives by 
the former if there is a clash.  
 
Presumably there should be very few cases where ECOSOC and UNGA 
directives clearly conflict. In the less than apparent cases, which would be 
                                                 
203 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 108, pp. 741-42. 
204 Shaw, supra note 149, p. 1198; Sands and Klein, supra note 110, p. 441; VCLT86, para. 
2(1)(j) 
205 UNHCR Statute, para. 3. 
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Sands and Klein, supra note 110, p. 455. 
207 UN Charter, Article 7. 
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more frequent, institutional practice indicates that UNHCR should follow 
ECOSOC directives. When ExCom was created in 1958, ECOSOC was 
called upon by the UNGA to establish an Executive Committee to “advise” 
UNHCR “at his request” on how to exercise his statutory functions and 
“approve projects”.211 This seemed to outline a largely passive role. But 
ECOSOC went further and granted ExCom broad authority to make policy 
determinations on how UNHCR was to plan and develop projects.212 This 
established a clearly active role for ExCom. ECOSOC did not contravene 
the UNGA, but expanded the powers of ExCom beyond what the UNGA 
had envisioned. Since the arrangement remains, it can be concluded that 
ECOSOC's practice was accepted by the UNGA. Thus, one can conclude 
that UNHCR remains bound by all directives from ECOSOC except those 
that clearly contravene UNGA directives.  
 
The observant reader will have realised that ECOSOC transferred some of 
its own control over to UNHCR through the progressive interpretation it 
made of the UNGA's request when creating ExCom. UNHCR's Statute only 
mentions a duty to take orders from ECOSOC and the UNGA, but through 
its actions ECOSOC created an intermediary that inherited some of its 
powers. The importance of ExCom was further enhanced when the UNGA 
decided to do the same as ECOSOC a few years later (1962).213 This brings 
us to the present, where ExCom is capable of issuing binding rules for 
UNHCR on behalf of both the UNGA and ECOSOC. Some commentators 
argue that the UNGA only gave ExCom legal power regarding material 
assistance issues and that it is only competent to offer 'advice' on protection 
matters.214 However, UNHCR's institutional practice shows that it has 
regarded ExCom's instructions on protection as binding. This establishes 
that ExCom conclusions bind UNHCR, on behalf of the UNGA and 
ECOSOC, in both protection and assistance matters.215 
8.2 Compliance with internal rules 
Generally it is easier to determine whether something complies with a rule 
the more precise that particular rule is. ExCom conclusions ought to be the 
most precise rules governing UNHCR's conduct as they are issued within 
boundaries set by the superior organs. Therefore UNHCR's conduct in 
relation to the MoU will be measured against ExCom conclusions first. 
Although one may argue that this method incorrectly takes for granted that 
                                                 
211 UNGA, International Assistance to Refugees Within the Mandate of the United Nations 
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ExCom conclusions are in compliance with UNHCR's mandate, this is not 
the authors intention, and the method is arguable more efficient. Only if the 
MoU complies with rules given by ExCom would one need to proceed to 
check it against rules laid down by superior organs as well. 
8.2.1 Grounds for involvement 
Repatriation is one of the original solutions to the situation of Refugees 
which UNHCR is to work towards. The Statute speaks of facilitation, a 
word whose meaning has been explained and changed over time. Through 
ExCom Conclusion 18 in 1980, it was declared that facilitation means that 
UNHCR will give its full support to Refugees who have already decided to 
repatriate.216 In 1985 the Mandate was broadened through ExCom 
Conclusion 40, to include a duty for UNHCR to promote repatriation 
movements when appropriate in the Organisation's view.217 Promotion was 
to include active involvement in planning, implementation and actual 
repatriation. Tripartite commissions were pointed out as useful tools.218 
Eighteen years later, in 2003, UNHCR was recommended to involve itself 
indirectly with States' efforts to return “persons found not to be in need of 
international protection”. It was also stated that UNHCR could be more 
closely involved upon a State's request, as long as it does not conflict with 
the Organisation's duty to provide protection.219 Further more, individuals 
found not in need of international protection were not to benefit from 
UNHCR's obligations according to ExCom resolutions 18 and 40.220 
 
Since the MoU involves asylum seekers who have not been rejected, as well 
as those who have, the validity of UNHCR's involvement depends on either 
one of the two above-mentioned criteria being fulfilled. Either Refugees as a 
group must have shown an interest in repatriating from Sweden to 
Afghanistan, or UNHCR must believe that the situation in Afghanistan is 
conducive to repatriation. It is safe to say that Afghan Refugees in Sweden 
have not voiced any public interest in repatriation. In fact, the community 
has been very vocal in its opposition against any return to Afghanistan.221 
This rules out a facilitating role for UNHCR and leaves the role of a 
promoter of repatriation. In other words, UNHCR's opinion about the 
situation in Afghanistan is the sole remaining valid reason for the 
Organisation's involvement in the MoU.  
 
The grave physical and material security situation in Afghanistan has been 
commented upon in Chapter 2. UNHCR has been an important source of 
information about the situation since well before the MoU was concluded, 
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and it must have been fully aware of the situation at the time. In their latest 
guidelines, published in December 2007, UNHCR acknowledge that the 
security situation has been constantly deteriorating since 2006 and that the 
sustainability of voluntary repatriation might be questionable.222 Keeping 
this in mind, it seems odd that UNHCR would have considered the situation 
in Afghanistan “appropriate” for promotion of voluntary return in 2006, and 
even more strange that UNHCR continues to consider the situation 
“appropriate” in 2007. However questionable UNHCR's involvement might 
be from an appropriateness perspective, it remains impossible to prove the 
Organisation objectively wrong on this account. It boils down to a question 
of UNHCR's opinion on the matter. Opinions can be more or less well 
founded, but not wrong. Thus UNHCR's actions must be presumed in 
compliance with internal rules, i.e. legal. 
8.2.2 The voluntariness criteria 
While the promotion of return to Afghanistan may not meet any legal 
problems, the actual degree of voluntariness envisioned in the MoU could. 
The MoU promises to respect “the primacy of voluntary return” and 
delineates who can opt for such return. At the same time it permits forcible 
returns as an option for those rejected asylum seekers who choose not to 
cooperate.223 In effect this recognises Sweden's right to exert positive and 
negative pressure on rejected asylum seekers with the purpose of making 
them return home. In national law, those who are rejected have an obligation 
to quit Swedish territory within two to four weeks of their final negative 
decision. Failure to comply will result in forcible removal.224 Since this is 
what rejected asylum seekers have to face, their choice to “voluntarily” 
return can hardly be regarded as truly voluntary. 
 
Over the years, ExCom conclusions have stressed repeatedly that reparation 
must be voluntary.225 However, when UNHCR was given a green light to 
cooperate with States' efforts to return rejected asylum seekers, the 
requirement that such returns be voluntary was dropped. That the rejected 
persons had been duly tried in a “fair” Refugee Status Determination (RSD) 
procedure replaced voluntariness as the necessary criterion for UNHCR's 
involvement.226 Thus it does not necesserliy pose a legal problem that 
rejected Afghan asylum seekers in Sweden are pressured to “voluntarily” 
return to Afghanistan under the MoU. But the legality of the MoU, and 
UNHCR's involvement, depends on Swedish RSD procedures being “fair”. 
This naturally entails compliance with internationally accepted standards. 
Though other international institutions may at times offer opinion on 
individual cases, the Swedish system as a whole is evaluated authoritatively 
only by UNHCR. That forces us to assume that UNHCR is acting according 
to the rules. 
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8.2.3 Conclusion 
All in all, it proves impossible to pronounce a convincing legal verdict 
against UNHCR's conclusion of the MoU based on a simple comparison of 
its actions and internal rules laid down by ExCom. These rules often require 
interpretation that is dependent on authority within the Refugee field. 
Whenever that is the case, there is an apparent problem since UNHCR is 
that sole authority. This leads to a catch 22 situation where the Organisation 
cannot be proven wrong. Since UNHCR's actions do not breach the more 
narrow rules, the thesis will now move on to evaluate their compliance with 
the broader rules in the next Chapter. 
 39
9 Compliance with the ‘object 
and purpose’ 
The treaty making capacity of UNHCR is not limited to certain kind of 
agreements by its Statute. Thus it appears as if the high standing enjoyed by 
the High Commissioner would allow the Organisation to enter into any 
category of agreement. As seen in the previous Chapter this is not the case. 
The room for manoeuvre is limited by rules from UNHCR's superior organs. 
However, these rules often rely on assessments of compliance with 
international refugee law that UNHCR has the ultimate authority to make. 
In such cases, it is impossible to confront UNHCR with conduct in violation 
of its internal rules.227 Would it not be possible nevertheless, to offer some 
convincing arguments on the permissibility of UNHCR's conduct in relation 
to the MoU?  
 
I believe this is the case. UNHCR's behaviour could, despite the problem 
outlined above, be measured against the 'object and purpose' of its Mandate: 
the protection of Refugees' “rights and welfare”.228 
 
To determine the permissibility of UNHCR's involvement in the MoU, 
based on its effects on Refugee protection, is not an easy task. One reason 
for its complicated nature is that UNHCR's work, as a rule, relates to 
Refugees as a group.229 Since UNHCR's duty to protect goes beyond the 
individual, it is not certain that what is negative for one Refugee, or even a 
smaller group, is wrong for the whole group overall. It is imaginable that 
UNHCR may even be right to pursue avenues that harm Refugees in order 
to uphold respect for the refugee system as a whole. How then, can a 
method to evaluate the MoU in light of the 'object and purpose' of UNHCR's 
Mandate be constructed?  
 
I believe that it is necessary to look at the MoU from multiple perspectives 
and draw conclusions based on a balancing of the sum total of the positive 
and negative aspects that can be distinguished. Thus, the thesis proceeds 
with evaluating UNHCR's involvement in the MoU from an organisational, 
legal protection and humanitarian perspective. 
9.1 Organisational perspective 
It has already been mentioned previously in the thesis that UNHCR is the 
only international institution dedicated to the rights of Refugees. The 
                                                 
227 See Chapter 8.2.3. 
228 UNHCR, UNHCR Strategy Towards 2000, para. 1, 
<www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b31c38.html>, visited on 20 July 2008; J.C. 
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obvious theoretical implication is that the more power and influence 
UNHCR has on the international political and legal scene, the better it is for 
Refugees' rights and welfare. So what is best for UNHCR? 
 
It is the Author's belief that the answer is best found through an examination 
of what made UNHCR become what it is. Hence, a brief exposé in 
UNHCR's organisational history follows. 
 
Through UNHCR's establishment, the IRO was replaced as the principal UN 
agency dealing with Refugees after only a few years of operation.230 Unlike 
its predecessor UNHCR, had only a small budget and limited staff 
resources, which were suited only for advocacy and coordination work in 
the absence of voluntary contributions.231 Consecutively, UNHCR enjoyed 
only limited legal and political influence despite the founders' proclamations 
of its high standing and importance. Moreover, due to the temporary nature 
of the mandate, its continued existence was constantly threatened in much 
the same way as its mightier predecessor had been.232 Should the High 
Commissioner have pursued unpopular or controversial goals opposed by 
those few Western States that were in control of the UN at the time, they 
could easily have forgone to renewing its Mandate. 
 
The first High Commissioners perceived an urgent need to prove the 
Organisation's worth in the eyes of Western donors and made choices 
accordingly.233 To promote UNHCR's political relevance, its role in 
emergency relief and economic development was pushed aggressively.234 
One of the first steps in this direction was providing relief to East-
Europeans fleeing to Berlin, despite insufficient mandate ratio personae at 
the time (1953).235 After that, the renewal of UNHCR's mandate and 
continued operations for an additional five years, beyond the initial three-
year mandate (which ended in 1954) was successfully lobbied.236 The 
strategy bore additional fruit in 1958, as the High Commissioner secured the 
right to appeal for voluntary contributions to the Organisation's work. This 
further strengthened the Organisation since it enabled the establishment of a 
larger and more permanent budget. In turn the Organisation was made less 
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sensitive to political context in general.237 Proven by the fact that UNHCR 
was able to engage in activities that somewhat challenged its creators. The 
Organisation's involvement with the plight of Algerian Refugees despite 
French concerns in 1957 act as an example.238 
 
Cold War politics increasingly hampered the efficiency of UNHCR's classic 
protection work, such as RSD, and kept the Organisation relying on other 
means to stay relevant.239 When States sought to manage their influence and 
instabilities in the Third World through humanitarian aid, among other 
things, UNHCR offered its services in delivering that aid.240 The political 
capital thus earned was invested in expanding legal protection for Refugees, 
through inter alia the advocacy work that resulted in two new refugee 
conventions: the 1967 Protocol and the 1969 Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) Convention on Refugees.241 This further raised UNHCR's 
international prestige and political influence. 
 
Through its focus on relief work UNHCR managed to expand its operational 
budget like no other UN organisation. Even though there was a dip in funds 
due to the decreased geopolitical interest in Refugees at the end of the Cold 
War,242 UNHCR's core expenditures grew by 16,000 percent between 1975 
and 1995.243 Attempts to qualm the establishment of rival agencies and 
promote UNHCR at the cost of the UN Office for Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs have also been successful.244 The mutual dependence 
created by UNHCR's relief work seems to have been a very good recipe for 
success. States will have fewer Refugees to cope with if outflows are limited 
by relief, and UNHCR can be sure to remain in existence while alleviating 
the suffering of even more individuals than those qualifying under the 
original refugee definition.245 Though funds aimed towards durable 
solutions make up a proportionally smaller sum of UNHCR's budget now 
than initially, they have remained largely constant in absolute numbers.246 
The fact that UNHCR still enjoys a substantial budget has silenced concerns 
voiced over the risk of overextending the Organisation's reach and the 
consequent loss of government interest to provide funding.247  
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From an organisational viewpoint, the MoU fits well into a proven approach 
to survival for UNHCR, which is, as outlined above, to stay relevant by 
getting involved. By having UNHCR with its good name on board in the 
“voluntary returns” program, Sweden assures that the coerced returns to 
Afghanistan look good domestically as well as internationally. UNHCR's 
involvement is a symbolic guarantee that events take place in accordance 
with international law and increase the willingness of asylum seekers to 
return.248 UNHCR on the other hand assure its access to funds which 
Sweden is willing to spend in returning Afghans. That limits competition by 
other organisations, such as the International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM), which typically assists in the return of rejected asylum seekers.249 It 
also allows UNHCR to supervise for free the Swedish part of returns in a 
qualitative manner, since Sweden pays the bill, and coordinate them with 
the already ongoing humanitarian work in Afghanistan.250  
 
Sweden's importance as a donor could also make the scales tip in favour of 
participation in the MoU. If one excludes the European Community which 
is not a State, Sweden has been UNHCR's fourth largest donor in absolute 
figures since 1995. Even more spectacular is that Sweden, together with 
USA, provides 77 percent of UNHCR's lightly earmarked funds.251 These 
funds are crucial to UNHCR's ability to conduct itself as it sees best in 
regards to its Mandate. While most Western States use earmarking to steer 
UNHCR's operations in a way designed to avert Refugee flows to their 
borders from States which they have some affiliation with, Sweden has a 
history of not forcing UNHCR's hand in such manner.252 However, Swedish 
donation practice has already changed in a more restrictive direction as it 
did not use to put any limitations at all on its donations.253 Thus, from 
UNHCR's viewpoint it would be undesirable to risk alienating Sweden by 
refusing to participate in returns to Afghanistan, at least as long as there is 
no good reason for taking that risk. 
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One reason to risk Sweden's goodwill may be UNHCR's dependence on its 
own high moral standing and authority. This is what UNHCR has to rely on 
in order to provide effective protection in the absence of any other means to 
make Western States abide by its assessment of what refugee law stipulates. 
Public shaming is of course an imaginable avenue as well, but the 
confrontational nature would risk the close relations with host States on 
which UNHCR depends.254 Sweden's continued unresponsiveness to 
UNHCR's public statements on how returns of rejected asylum seekers 
should take place risk undermining the Organisation's authority. All returns 
of Afghans from Sweden have been to Kabul, regardless of whether the 
returnee has any ties to the area.255 Those who would have to travel onwards 
to reach their home area are provided only with a cash grant for that 
purpose.256 Sweden does not appear to give any regard to whether the 
returnee's home area is safe or even possible to return to. UNHCR's opinion 
on the other hand, is that the legality of returns depends on whether the 
rejected asylum seeker can be returned to her place of former residence.257 
Sweden's rejection of this claim is especially harmful since it promised, by 
signing of the MoU, to carry out only sustainable returns.258 Thus, the 
Swedish returns to Kabul not only display blatant disregard for UNHCR's 
authority to pronounce what a sustainable return is, but UNHCR's continued 
participation in the MoU also makes it seem like the Organisation yields to 
the Swedish interpretation and has gone back on its own. This erodes 
UNHCR's authority, and by extension reduces its hard fought influence on 
global refugee policy, thus undermining its relevance as an independent 
international organisation. 
9.1.1 Conclusion 
UNHCR's successful strategy for increased influence and secured survival 
as an organisation has been to broaden its Mandate and expand its budget. 
Involvement in the MoU fits well within this strategy. Though the additional 
funds made directly available to UNHCR by Sweden as a result of its 
participation in the MoU may be insignificant from a global perspective, for 
UNHCR to be perceived as active and involved might be more important in 
the larger scheme of things. Sweden is also one of the more important 
sources of high quality funding, provided on time as pledged and only 
lightly, or not at all, restricted. This is the kind of funding that enables 
UNHCR to act independently. On the other hand, Sweden has already 
dropped from the number one provider of completely unrestricted funding 
in 2000, to 20th place in 2006.259 Nevertheless, the level of funds donated by 
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Sweden remains largely the same over time. This indicates that Swedish 
policy is changing towards a more instrumental character, but remains 
favourable to UNHCR in general. In such situation it can neither be 
expected with certainty that participation is going to win UNHCR any 
favours, nor that abstention will bring any retaliation. Thus, from an 
organisational perspective Sweden's disregard for UNHCR's opinion might 
actually do more damage than any benefits which UNHCR could derive 
from participating in the MoU. 
9.2 Legal protection perspective 
Another core question is how UNHCR's participation in the MoU influences 
the availability of legal protection to asylum seekers, especially those from 
Afghanistan. To determine this, it is not enough to simply read through the 
MoU. How the document interacts with factual and legal circumstances 
must also be taken into consideration. Nonetheless, the provisions of the 
MoU are a good start; which will be followed by an inquiry into how the 
MoU affects rejected asylum seekers' access to protection, as well as 
UNHCR's ability to provide protection. 
9.2.1 Provisions of the MoU 
For the most part, it seems as if through the MoU UNHCR has only secured 
assurances from Sweden and Afghanistan, that they will abide by what they 
are already legally bound to under international law. Afghanistan promise to 
readmit its nationals, not harass them on return and allow them to settle 
where they want.260 These promises have already been made to the 
international community at large through ratification of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention 
Against Torture (CAT).261 It is uncertain what UNHCR has to gain by 
Afghanistan's repetition of these commitments, especially since promises 
made through the MoU cannot presently be enforced through international 
legal dispute resolution mechanism within the UN.262 Afghanistan also 
promises to allow foreign spouses, of returning Afghans, to enter and reside 
in the country.263 The carte blanche nature of the promise is a potential gain 
for UNHCR in State acceptance of the principle of family unity.264  
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Both Sweden and Afghanistan promise to allow UNHCR unhindered access 
to Afghans within the scope of the MoU.265 Considering that both countries 
are Parties to the 1951 Convention and thus obligated to cooperate with 
UNHCR in its work on behalf of Refugees, this seems mostly like another 
empty repetition,266 as is the Swedish and Afghan assertion that UNHCR's 
right to monitor returns of rejected asylum seekers will be respected.267 The 
common commitment to ease customs formalities with regards to returning 
Afghans' property, on the other hand, is a positive step towards recognition 
of their right to property.268 
 
Sweden's assurances that returns will be carried out in compliance with 
international law does not break any new ground, but the promise not to 
return any children without successful family tracing is a positive 
recognition of UNHCR's guidelines in relation to the issue.269 
 
Based on the above, it can be concluded that provisions in the MoU do not 
further the rights of Refugees in any significant way. For the most part, the 
promises made are merely affirmations that the State Parties will abide by 
rules they already accepted. Since the MoU is non-enforceable within the 
UN system absent a registration with the UNSG, UNHCR's legal position 
remains the same as before its involvement in the MoU, though there are 
marginal but observable gains in acceptance of UNHCR's progressive 
interpretation of refugee law. 
9.2.2 Asylum seekers access to protection 
It is convenient to assume that once an Afghan asylum seeker has been 
rejected by the final instance of the Swedish asylum system, her status is 
conclusively determined. There are two reasons why this is an inaccurate 
view. For one, 'refugee' is something a person becomes the instant an 
international border is crossed due to a well-founded fear of persecution on 
the grounds specified in the 1951 Refugee Convention. National RSD 
procedures mislead by name since they merely declare someone a Refugee 
and they do not create Refugees then and there.270 Secondly, Swedish RSD 
procedures are constructed, for better or worse, in such a way that an asylum 
seeker can have her case tried repeatedly. The only requirement is that the 
asylum seeker produces evidence of new circumstances that she was unable 
to present the last time the case was tried. However the rule is quite strict, 
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requiring that the new evidence did not exist or that trauma prevented the 
asylum seeker from presenting the evidence before.271 Nevertheless, an 
asylum seeker can theoretically have her claim tried again and again an 
indefinite number of times. Thus the chance to have a valid claim for 
refugee status recognised cease to exist only once the claimant leaves 
Sweden.  
 
Before the MoU was adopted there were two principal measures designed to 
help sever the connection between the rejected asylum seeker and Sweden. 
To begin with the asylum seeker would be at risk of forceful deportation if 
she did not leave voluntarily after a final rejection. Secondly, subsidies that 
every asylum seeker receives could be cut partially or completely, save a 
right to food and shelter within a designated reception centre, for reasons of 
non-cooperation in a deportation.272 What constitutes uncooperative 
behaviour is interpreted broadly, and a refusal to seek out one's embassy to 
acquire a passport, for example, will result in a partial denial of subsidies.273  
 
In effect, the MoU is an additional measure to help sever the link between 
the asylum seeker and Sweden. It adds a pull-factor to the previously 
described push-factors in that the rejected asylum seeker will be financially 
compensated if she quits Sweden voluntarily. Thus, the MoU increases the 
probability that a rejected asylum seeker will elect to give up and depart 
from Sweden.274 Hence, the MoU decreases the chance that an individual 
asylum seeker will be recognised, which is undesirable from a legal 
protection perspective. However, the MoU helps Sweden come to terms 
with a problem which, if left uncorrected, might seriously diminish 
Sweden's wish to let asylum seekers enter in the first place. If those who 
have been through the RSD procedures once refuse to leave after being 
denied refugee status, the whole asylum system will become swamped. 
Absent an increase in funds, the quality of RSD procedures will most likely 
drop. If one looks at the state of other already underfunded national asylum 
systems, the conclusion must be that this will not result in a more generous 
asylum policy in Sweden either.275 Needless to say, this would also be 
negative from a protection perspective. The potentially negative long-term 
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"Dublin Regulation" (2008) pp. 4-6, <www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4805bde42.html>, 
visited on 31 July 2008; M. Sperl, 'Fortress Europe and the Iraqi ‘intruders’: Iraqi Asylum-
Seekers and the EU, 2003-2007',144 UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research (2007) pp. 
5-7 and 11, <www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/470c9be92.pdf>, visited on 31 July 
2008. 
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effects of an overburdened asylum system may thus overshadow the short 
term, and largely individual, positive effects of the MoU's non-existence.  
9.2.3 UNHCR’s ability to provide protection 
As explained in Chapter 8.2.3, there is nothing illegal per se with UNHCR's 
involvement in a State's exertion of pressure to make rejected asylum 
seekers leave “voluntarily”.276 However, a prerequisite for UNHCR's lawful 
involvement is that the rejected asylum seekers have been tried in fair RSD 
procedures.277 Thus the legal correctness of UNHCR's initial, as well as 
continued, involvement in the MoU depends on whether Swedish RSD 
procedures conform to international standards. This dependence makes 
UNHCR a captive of its own policy and has a negative impact on the 
Organisation's general ability to protect the rights of Refugees. For one, 
UNHCR's willingness to critique Swedish conduct will be diminished. 
Critique which might imply that events incompatible with a fair RSD 
system took place before the MoU was initially signed, or renewed in 2007, 
cannot be brought forth. Because this would imply that UNHCR has acted 
in violation of its Mandate when it initially signed, or when it renewed, the 
MoU. Naturally this applies regardless of whether Afghans were those 
victimised or not.  
 
Since there is reason to believe that events incompatible with fair RSD 
procedures take place in Sweden, the above is not merely a theoretical issue. 
Though UNHCR is the only international institution solely concerned with 
Refugees there are others with international responsibilities that sometimes 
coincide with the protection of Refugees' rights. The Committee Against 
Torture278, the European Court of Human Rights279 and the Human Rights 
Committee280 are all examples of institutions that act as guardians of rights 
which benefit Refugees.281 Unlike UNHCR, they do not have a 
distinguished operational character but enjoy a judicial capacity to 
determine breaches of norms they are set to guard.282 Refugees in Sweden 
                                                 
276 A.k.a., promoting voluntary return. 
277 UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion on Legal Safety Issues In the Context of Voluntary 
Repatriation of Refugees, No. 101 (LV), second paragraph; UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion 
No. 96 (LIV). 
278 CAT, Articles 17 and 21. 
279 'Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention on Human Rights)' [ECHR] Articles 19, 33 and 34 in G. Melander (ed.) et al., 
The Raoul Wallenberg Institute Compilation of Human rights Instruments (Koninkljike 
Brill NV, Leiden, 2004) p. 61. 
280 ICCPR, Articles 28 and 41; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights [ICCPR OP-1] (999 UNTS 171) Article 1. 
281 CAT, Article 3; ECHR, Article 3; Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, 
European Court of Human Rights, para. 111, <www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc>, visited 1 
August 2008; ICCPR, Article 7. 
282 Since Sweden has ratified the respective instruments and communicated its acceptance 
of each institution's judicial capacity: CAT, acceptance upon ratification in January 1986. 
ICCPR, acceptance in November 1971: Bayefsky, 
<www.bayefsky.com/html/sweden_t1_ratifications.php> and 
<www.bayefsky.com/html/sweden_t2_cat.php>, visited on 1 August 2008; 
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have sought their rightful recognition through these institutions on several 
occasions after being denied asylum by Sweden. Though there are several 
instances where the claims have been recognised by the international 
institutions, this does not always mean that Sweden has failed to honour its 
obligations under the 1951 Convention.283 The reason is that cases before 
the international institutions mentioned often concern rights under an 
extended refugee definition. But since all Refugees are tried within the same 
national system, the flaws exposed affect all equally, convention refugees or 
not.  
 
There are several cases where Sweden has been proven to have decided 
erroneously on the claims of asylum seekers. Some cases have concerned 
denial of effective appeal,284 though most cases involved an inappropriately 
high demand for consistency on the claimant's story and disregard for 
material evidence.285 The most recent example concerned a Rwandan 
woman who claimed that she would face torture upon return to her home 
country. After being denied Refugee status in Sweden, she complained to 
the Committee Against Torture, which found that evidence to her advantage 
had been blatantly disregarded by Swedish authorities.286 The Committee 
also found that Sweden had dismissed her credibility too easily as there 
existed no material discrepancies in her story.287 With regards to the rarity 
of asylum seekers who have resources at their disposal to successfully bring 
their case all the way to the international level, it can be assumed that there 
are many more gravely erroneous decisions that are never brought to 
adjudication. However, even without taking those potential cases into 
consideration, those observed raise doubt whether Swedish RSD procedures 
                                                                                                                            
 ECHR, acceptance in February 1952: Council of Europe Treaty Section, 
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45; T.A. and S.T. v. Sweden, 27 May 2005, Committee Against Torture 
(CAT/C/34/D/226/2003) para. 7(3);  
 Karoui v. Sweden, 8 May 2002, Committee Against Torture 
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 Ayas v. Sweden, 12 November 1998, Committee Against Torture 
(CAT/C/21/D/97/1997) para. 6(5); A.F. v. Sweden, 8 May 1998, Committee Against 
Torture (CAT/C/20/D/89/1997) para. 6(5); Tala v. Sweden, 15 November 1996, Committee 
Against Torture (CAT/C/17/D/43/1996) paras. 10(3) and 10(4);  
 Muzonzo v. Sweden, 8 May 1996, Committee Against Torture 
(CAT/C/16/D/41/1996) para. 9(4) and 9(5). 
286 C.T. and K.M. v. Sweden, 7 December 2006, Committee Against Torture 
(CAT/C/37/D/279/2005) paras. 7(5) and 7(7). 
287 Ibid.., para. 7(6). 
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live up to international standards.288 The strength of evidence that an asylum 
seeker is required to provide seems particularly questionable and might very 
well exceed the internationally accepted “reasonable degree”.289  
 
A look at how the Swedish Aliens Act is interpreted indicates that Sweden 
does not intend to fully conform to international verdicts on its asylum 
procedures. Through its recent practice, the Swedish Migration Court of 
Appeal raised the bar for what Refugees need to prove. No longer is it 
sufficient to prove a reasonable (“rimlig”) risk of persecution, but a probable 
(“sannolik”) risk is needed.290 Within Swedish administrative law practice 
the latter is often said to signify a probability of approximately 75 
percent.291 This is well beyond the level agreed on in international law, 
which would be better described as somewhat less than 50 percent, or 
slightly above for the asylum seeker who does not provide a generally 
credible story.292 Naturally these figures lack independent value, but they 
are significant for the relationship they illustrate between national and 
international requirements on probability within RSD procedures. 
 
Based on the above, it appears as if there are good reasons for UNHCR to 
avoid a lock-in that could limit its capacity to provide legal protection to 
asylum seekers. Participation in the MoU will impede UNHCR's ability to 
take as critical a stand as could be needed on asylum law issues. Because 
any critique by UNHCR that would seem to counter its assessment of the 
quality of Swedish RSD procedures would risk raising doubts of the legality 
of the Organisation's involvement in the promotion of returns to 
Afghanistan. In addition, Swedish RSD procedures arguably do not comply 
fully with international standards. 
                                                 
288 Although it should be noted that the Committee Against Torture generally requires less 
evidence from a claimant than required by other international human rights treaties, such as 
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289 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status [the 
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9.3 Humanitarian protection perspective 
As previously stated, the MoU increases the probability that an asylum 
seeker will return to Afghanistan. But the negative impact on the 
humanitarian situation for those of concern to UNHCR does not necessarily 
begin only after they have returned to Afghanistan. Already while the 
rejected asylum seekers, or shall we say potential Refugees, are still in 
Sweden, the Swedish Migration Board (SMB) could attempt to use the MoU 
as an additional ground for limiting access to material assistance. Refusal to 
return “voluntarily” could be interpreted by SMB as obstruction of a 
deportation decision, and that would legally empower the Board to cut 
sustenance.293 Thus the MoU could lead to adverse humanitarian 
consequences. 
 
Upon return to Afghanistan, the asylum seeker does not only move from one 
physical location to another, she is transferred from one legal category to 
another -- most likely from the status of a potential Refugee to that of an 
IDP.294 More importantly however, she is transferred from one humanitarian 
situation to another. While asylum seekers can be forced to live under harsh 
conditions in Sweden, especially if they have been rejected, they remain 
largely safe from material harm. Once in Afghanistan as an IDP, that 
changes drastically. While those who return are not targeted by anyone 
because they have fled Afghanistan,295 it is safe to assume that they run a 
larger risk because of their status as IDP. As previously stated, Afghanistan 
is a clan based society where there are presently no other mechanisms to 
secure material safety.296 The conclusion must be that return to Afghanistan 
is something negative from a humanitarian perspective. Since the MoU is 
likely to increase the probability of return, by extension, the agreement is 
negative from a humanitarian perspective. 
 
Although the risk of being forcefully returned to Afghanistan is relatively 
small should one refuse to return voluntarily under the MoU, the risk is 
there nevertheless. If the voluntary return program had not existed, a 
number of rejected asylum seekers who did return under the MoU between 
2006 and 2008 would have been forcefully returned instead. Granted that 
their return was statistically unavoidable, the MoU has served as a 
mitigating factor of their humanitarian situation upon return. Without the 
MoU, and the financial support provided by Sweden under its terms, these 
individuals would have been left even more helpless in Afghanistan. To 
better understand the significance of Swedish direct aid to returning 
Afghans one need only to compare the sums that UNHCR is able to provide 
Afghans returning from Iran or Pakistan. While an Afghan family returning 
from Sweden can secure a maximum of SEK 50,000, a family returning 
                                                 
293 See Chapter 9.2.2. 
294 See Chapter Fel! Hittar inte referenskälla.. 
295 K. Lumpp et al., supra note 54, p. 161. 
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from a neighbouring country can only expect a sum equal to SEK 650 to 
740 from UNHCR.297 
9.4 Conclusion, ‘object and purpose’ 
evaluation 
After careful consideration of the MoU from an organisational, protection 
and humanitarian perspective, the time has come to weigh the advantages 
and disadvantages against each other and present a conclusion. Does 
UNHCR's participation in the MoU contradict the 'object and purpose' of its 
Mandate -- the protection of Refugees' “rights and welfare”? 
 
The text of the MoU does not promise many advantages in terms of 
strengthened Refugee rights. Most commitments that the State Parties make 
have already been made before or amount to marginal improvements, and in 
practice these commitments may not even be worth as much as those 
involved might have hoped. Sweden made a promise, to fully respect 
UNHCR's right to monitor the compliance of returns with international law, 
which amply illustrates this.298 Since the MoU also calls for all returns to 
take place in conformity with international law,299 one would think that 
returns against UNHCR's recommendations would not occur. But as a 
matter of fact, Sweden has returned Afghans against UNHCR 
recommendations.300 This nullifies the theoretical protection advantages 
contained in text. 
 
Sweden's disregard for UNHCR's opinion is perhaps most alarming due to 
the risk it poses for more far-reaching consequences -- ultimately the 
erosion of UNHCR's highly respected standing in international law and the 
ensuing loss of protection potential. If a wealthy country like Sweden does 
not adhere to international refugee law as pronounced by UNHCR, why 
should less wealthy countries do so? Arguably this could not have been 
predicted at the time of signature and only act as an argument against 
UNHCR's continued participation. Flaws in Swedish RSD procedures, on 
the other hand, should have been something that UNHCR was well aware of 
before signing the MoU. The consequence of these flaws is that UNHCR 
limits its own ability to critique Sweden after signing the MoU, because 
critique that raise doubts about Swedish RSD standards' conformity with 
international law can make UNHCR's choice to participate in the MoU seem 
legally questionable. While this decreases protection available to Refugees, 
their access to protection is also limited through the increased probability 
                                                 
297 Based on the now obsolete exchange rate between SEK and USD mentioned in the MoU 
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that they will return which results from the MoU. However, the increased 
probability of return might ironically also act to secure access for all 
Refugee in the long run since it alleviates Swedish RSD procedures from 
becoming overburdened with rejected asylum seekers. 
 
Another prerequisite for UNHCR's ability to act independently from States 
and take firm stands on protection issues, is access to unrestricted funds. 
Though Sweden is one of the more important sources of such funding, there 
is little reason to think that participation in the MoU will have any 
significant effect on Swedish funding patterns. However, the importance of 
the financial support that Sweden provides directly to those Afghans who 
return under the terms of the MoU should not be underestimated. The 
humanitarian gain is somewhat cast in shadow by the risk that non-
cooperation in “voluntary” returns under the MoU might serve as an 
additional basis on which Swedish authorities could make the life miserable 
for those Afghans who refuse to size the “opportunity”. 
 
In light of the kind of negative effects that the MoU could have on 
UNHCR's organisational integrity, one would expect to find something that 
was clearly worth the gamble. However, the manner in which the MoU has 
been implemented has produced a net negative effect on protection available 
or provided to Refugees. Any positive protection effects remain nothing 
more than future potential. The clearly positive humanitarian effects that can 
be observed could perhaps have outweighed the Organisational and 
protection related uncertainties. But seeing as how the humanitarian benefits 
could come at the expense of well deserved protection – since asylum 
seekers might choose to leave Sweden and Swedish RSD procedures 
“prematurely” – they do not sufficiently influence the evaluation enough for 
a positive verdict. If not initially, then at least by the end of 2007, when it 
should have been clear to UNHCR that Sweden did not abide by its 
guidelines, the negative aspect of participating in the MoU outweighed the 
positive. The conclusion must be that UNHCR has acted in a manner 
detrimental to the 'object and purpose' of its Mandate. By doing so, the 
Organisation has acted illegally.  
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10 Illegal acts by international 
organisations 
It was concluded in Chapter 9.4 that UNHCR had acted in a manner which 
could be regarded as illegal. While such a statement answers one question, it 
naturally produces other questions. Since the illegality of UNHCR's 
involvement stems from the adverse effects its participation in the MoU has 
on the rights of Refugees, will this fact force the Organisation to cease its 
participation? Will those whose rights are infringed upon have access to 
some form of redress? 
 
UNHCR member States could potentially bring its participation in the MoU 
to an end. It has long been recognised within the international sphere that 
member States of international organisations have an inherent right to 
protest against decisions that are detrimental to their interests. This right 
applies regardless of the availability of provisions to that effect.301 However, 
as discussed before there good reasons to believe that Sweden and 
Afghanistan share a mutual interest in the return of Afghan citizens. 
Therefore chances are virtually non-existent that any of them would 
challenge the MoU's validity. Though Afghan officials have publicly voiced 
their concern over the validity of the MoU, they have not acted on that 
statement.302  
 
If neither Sweden, nor Afghanistan is likely to overturn the MoU, there is 
not much hope for any action from other UNHCR members either. For one, 
States generally show reluctance to overturn decisions of international 
organisations out of political considerations.303 Secondly, in abstaining from 
protesting at the time when UNHCR concluded the MoU, they have given 
their silent consent.304 
 
To hope that the Parties would simply give the MoU up is also a futile 
thought, though scholars have voiced the idea that acts which are contrary to 
the 'object and purpose' of an international organisation could be regarded as 
“manifestly ultra vires” and thus without legal effect per se.305 The idea was 
discarded but received some recognition of later date, with the additional 
remark that international organisations should be liable for damages 
incurred by such acts.306 Yet again this takes for granted that one of the 
concluding Parties wishes not to be bound. It also overlooks that damages 
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can only be claimed by injured States. The individuals who are the potential 
victims in the present case would be left without any remedy.  
 
The immunity of international organisations to claims by individuals is a 
legacy from times when no one perceived that their actions would ever 
seriously affect the lives of individuals directly.307 But in a world where 
peacekeeping missions and individualised sanctions by the UNSC are 
commonplace, there is reason to believe that conflicts between international 
organisations and individuals are going to increase. But currently, apart 
from claims by employees, the international veil of immunity is only 
breached with any regularity on an ad hoc basis through arbitration 
commissions.308 This means that individuals are barred from effective 
remedies to which they are entitled under international human rights law.309 
 
Of the solutions that Klabbers proposes to the correction of illegal acts by 
international institutions, only the highly progressive idea to grant the ICJ ex 
officio power to monitor their decisions would have any chance to see the 
MoU terminated under the present circumstances.310 Alternatively, locus 
standi before the court could be extended to non-governmental 
organisations (NGO), who could be expected to be more proactive than 
States. However, there is not much to say that States would abide by rulings 
where a claim was brought against their will by an NGO. 
 
In conclusion, regardless of the illegality of UNHCR's participation in the 
MoU, there is nothing within the realm of international law that can force 
the Organisation to terminate its participation. In addition, there is no 
readily available avenue for those whose rights have been infringed upon to 
seek redress. 
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11 Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis was to prove that the permissibility of UNHCR's 
participation in the MoU is a question of law and then answer that question. 
 
First it was established that UNHCR displays sufficient independence to be 
regarded as an international organisation in addition to its status as a 
subsidiary organ of the UNGA. An examination of UNHCR's constituent 
instrument and institutional practice revealed that it possesses sufficient 
personality to conclude binding international agreements. It was further 
established that the MoU could be regarded as such an agreement. Hence 
UNHCR's actions in relation to the MoU were placed firmly within the legal 
sphere. 
 
In order to determine UNHCR's ability to legally participate in the MoU, the 
source and substance of internal rules governing the Organisation's actions 
were sought. It was laid down who possesses the authority to establish rules 
that govern UNHCR's operations beyond the limits imposed by its Mandate. 
The internal rules were then closely scrutinized to determine whether 
UNHCR could legally participate in the MoU. An evaluation of UNHCR's 
conduct against the more narrow rules provided by ExCom revealed that 
they were of limited value for an assessment of the Organisation's actions. 
Thus an answer had to be sought through an evaluation of UNHCR's 
conduct against its 'object and purpose' as an international organisation. 
Through this method it was established, with a narrow margin, that UNHCR 
had acted contrary to its 'object and purpose'. For an international 
organisation this amounts to an illegal act. 
 
The serious nature of UNHCR's breach of law cannot be underestimated. As 
the sole guardian of refugees' rights, the Organisation does not only deprive 
Refugees of protection, it leaves them without access to a remedy. This is a 
result of the lack of other international subjects who has an interest in 
correcting UNHCR's behaviour. Since the Organisation can act with 
impunity, stringency in its internal application of refugee law is all the more 
important. Unfortunately there are tell-tale signs that the Organisation is 
placing less emphasis on strict compliance with the law. UNHCR's recent 
history has not only been filled with dubious repatriation activities,311 
internal structures established to ensured rigorous conformity with law have 
also shown signs of weakening.312 
 
I would argue that the time has come for UNHCR to revive its past and 
return to a focus on legal protection. UNHCR might have felt a need once 
upon a time to involve itself in humanitarian assistance as a means to ensure 
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its survival. However, the Organisation is a institution today and not likely 
to disappear. It is time UNHCR remembered that humanitarian assistance 
was supposed to be a 'means' not an 'end'. There are numerous other actors 
that are capable of alleviating the suffering of the millions displaced, but 
only one organisation with a mandate to protect their legal rights. UNHCR 
should honour this obligation, because that is what sets the Organisation 
apart. That is what Refugees need. 
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Annex B 
Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding (the MoU) between, the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Government of 
the Kingdom of Sweden and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) 
 
The Government of the Kingdom of Sweden, the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan and UNHCR, hereinafter referred to as ''the 
Parties", 
 
(a) Recognizing that the right of all citizens to leave and to return to their 
country is a basic human right enshrined, inter alia, in Article 13(2) of the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 12 of the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 
 
(b) Recalling that the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in 
Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government 
Institutions signed, under the auspices of the United Nations, in Bonn on 5 
December 200j (the Bonn Agreement) has laid the foundation for achieving 
lasting peace, national unity, reconciliation and social and economic 
development in Afghanistan and noting the progress made towards this end; 
 
(c) Welcoming the fact that large numbers of Afghan citizens have already 
returned to their homeland and that many more are in the process of doing 
so bringing back valuable experiences and skills; 
 
(d) Resolved to cooperate in order to assist the voluntary, dignified, safe and 
orderly return to and successful reintegration in Afghanistan of Afghans 
now in Sweden; 
 
(e) Noting the desire of the Parties to work with each other to achieve full 
observance of international human rights and humanitarian standards; 
 
(f) Recognizing the need to establish a framework for such co-operation, to 
ensure proper planning as well as to agree on specific procedures and 
modalities of return and reintegration programmes, as may be supported, 
where appropriate, by other Intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organizations; 
[...] 
PARAGRAPH 25 
Coming Into effect 
This MoU will come into effect upon signature by the Parties. 
 
PARAGRAPH 26 
Amendment 
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This MoU may be amended by mutual consent in writing between the 
Parties. 
 
PARAGRAPH 27 
Termination 
This MoU will be valid until 31 December 2007. 
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Annex C 
Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding (the MoU) between, the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Government of the 
Kingdom of Sweden and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR)  
 
The Government of the Kingdom of Sweden, the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan and UNHCR, hereinafter referred to as "the Parties", 
 
(a) Recognizing that the right of all citizens to leave and to return to their country is 
a basic human right enshrined, inter alia, in Article 13(2) of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Article 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights; 
 
(b) Recalling that the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan 
Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions signed, under 
the auspices of the United Nations, in Bonn on 5 December 200j (the Bonn 
Agreement) has laid the foundation for achieving lasting peace, national unity, 
reconciliation and social and economic development in Afghanistan and noting the 
progress made towards this end; 
 
(c) Welcoming the fact that large numbers of Afghan citizens have already returned 
to their homeland and that many more are in the process of doing so bringing back 
valuable experiences and skills; 
 
(d) Resolved to cooperate in order to assist the voluntary, dignified, safe and 
orderly return to and successful reintegration in Afghanistan of Afghans now in 
Sweden; 
 
(e) Noting the desire of the Parties to work with each other to achieve full 
observance of international human rights and humanitarian standards; 
 
(f) Recognizing the need to establish a framework for such co-operation, to ensure 
proper planning as well as to agree on specific procedures and modalities of return 
and reintegration programmes, as may be supported, where appropriate, by other 
Intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations; 
 
Have reached the following understandings: 
 
PARAGRAPH 1 
Scope 
This MoU will cover any Afghan citizen, as defined in Afghan Law, who is staying 
in Sweden, irrespective of his or her legal status, 
 
PARAGRAPH 2 
Objectives 
With this MoU. the Parties wish to lay the basis for a closely coordinated. phased 
and humane process of assisted return of Afghans in Sweden which respects the 
primacy of voluntary return and which takes account of the conditions in 
Afghanistan, of the importance of safe. dignified and sustainable return, and of 
return programmes for Afghans from other host countries. 
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PARAGRAPH 3 
Modalities of Return 
The Parties hereby accept that the return of all Afghans will, subject to the proper 
operation of this paragraph. take place at their freely expressed wish, based on their 
knowledge of the situation in Intended places of return and of any options for 
continued stay in Sweden: 
 
I Afghans holding a permanent residence permit in Sweden, will 
return to Afghanistan on the basis of their freely expressed wish in accordance with 
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. 
 
II Afghans with pending applications for asylum who decide of their 
own free will to return to Afghanistan can opt for voluntary return. 
 
III Afghans. who are found not to have protection needs or 
humanitarian reasons in accordance with the regulations in the Swedish Aliens Act 
could opt for voluntary return after a final negative decision on their asylum claim. 
 
In compliance with the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol and relevant national law of Sweden, alternatives to voluntary 
Return recognized as being acceptable under international law may be examined 
with regard to Afghans and who have no protection or compelling humanitarian 
needs justifying prolongation of their stay in Sweden, but who nevertheless, after 
the passage of reasonable time, continue to refuse to avail themselves of the 
Voluntary Return Programme set forth in this MoU. Prior to considering such 
alternatives for the persons concerned, all humanitarian aspects of their situation 
will be given fair consideration, during the asylum process in accordance with the 
Swedish Aliens Act, adequate notification will be provided, and they will be 
encouraged to opt for 
voluntary return. The Government of the Kingdom of Sweden will take into 
consideration the situation in Afghanistan when considering the application for 
asylum. 
 
IV.  Return may include - based exclusively on decisions in accordance 
with Swedish legislation - alternatives to voluntary return of Afghans ordered to 
leave Sweden, as an option of last resort. 
 
The return process of Afghans found through this process not to have protection or 
compelling humanitarian needs will be phased. orderly and humane and 
accomplished in manageable numbers. 
 
PARAGRAPH 4 
Re-admission 
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will readmit its nationals 
and will assist, where necessary, in determining the Afghan nationality of persons 
intending to benefit from assistance under this MoU, within the shortest possible 
time and in any case no later than within four months. The Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden 
will cooperate closely in this respect in order also to avoid any cases of 
statelessness. 
 
PARAGRAPH 5 
Commitments upon Return 
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The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will, together with other 
relevant bodies carry out the necessary measures to ensure that Afghans abroad can 
return without any fear of harassment, intimidation, persecution, discrimination 
prosecution or any punitive measures whatsoever. These safeguards do not prelude 
the right of the competent authorities of Afghanistan to prosecute individuals on 
account of war crimes and crimes against humanity, as defined In international 
instruments, or very serious common crimes involving death or severe bodily harm 
in accordance with established human rights standards.  
 
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan recalls in this respect the 
guarantees contained in Decree No. 297, dated 13.03.1380 (3 June 2002) on the 
dignified return of Afghan refugees, which fully applies to Afghans returning from 
Sweden under this MoU. 
 
PARAGRAPH 6 
Freedom of Choice of Destination 
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan accepts that Afghans 
returning from abroad will be free to settle in their former place of residence or any 
other place of their choice in Afghanistan. 
 
PARAGRAPH 7 
Juridical Status and Equivalency 
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan accepts, in accordance 
with Afghan law, to recognize the legal status, including changes thereto, of 
Afghans returning from Sweden, including births, deaths, adoptions, marriages and 
divorces. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will also seek to 
recognize, as appropriate and in cooperation with the Swedish authorities, the 
equivalency of academic and vocational skills diplomas and certificates obtained 
by Afghans while in Sweden. 
 
PARAGRAPH 8 
UNHCR's Role 
The role of UNHCR in assisting, facilitating and monitoring the return of Afghans, 
in order to ensure that it is carried out in a manner consistent with its mandate and 
with the terms of this MoU, will be fully respected by the two other Parties. In 
close co-operation with its partners UNHCR will co-operate with the Swedish 
authorities on a programme for Afghans including the provision of Information, 
counseling and registration in Sweden. 
 
PARAGRAPH 9 
Information and Sensitization 
The Government of the Kingdom of Sweden, the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan and UNHCR will cooperate closely to ensure, with the 
assistance if necessary of other partners, that Afghans covered by this MoU are 
provided with objective and accurate information relevant to their return and 
reintegration in Afghanistan, to allow for decisions to return to be taken in full 
knowledge of the facts. To this effect, UNHCR will in co-operation with the 
Swedish authorities and partners provide information targeted at Afghans in 
Sweden. 
 
The Government. of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will, with a view to 
creating conditions conducive to the reintegration of returnees in safety and with 
dignity, with the assistance of UNHCR and other relevant partners carry out all 
necessary measures to sensitize the population. 
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PARAGRAPH 10 
Counseling, Registration and Documentation 
In accordance with its mandated responsibility to ensure the voluntary character of 
the decision to return, UNHCR will. in consultation and co-operation with the 
Government of the Kingdom of Sweden, provide the most appropriate means for 
the counseling and registration of Afghans contemplating return, if necessary, with 
the assistance of other inter-governmental or nongovernmental organizations. 
 
Duly completed Voluntary Return Forms (VRFs), issued in Sweden by the 
Swedish authorities in co-operation with UNHCR, signed by each adult male and 
female Afghan, will be recognized by the Parties as valid travel documents for the 
purpose of the return to their final destinations in Afghanistan of Afghans returning 
under this MoU. VRFs will be signed by a representative of UNHCR to attest to 
the voluntary character of the decision to return. 
 
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will, in cases in which 
Afghans wishing to return do not hold documents establishing their identity, issue 
identity documents without delay through their diplomatic representations. after 
going through the legal procedures of the Afghan Government. The Government of 
the Kingdom of Sweden will contribute towards the costs of the issuance of 
identity documents to Afghans returning under this MoU. 
 
For Afghans who have no protection or humanitarian needs justifying prolongation 
of their stay in Sweden and who nevertheless, after a passage of reasonable time 
following the communication of a final negative decision. continue to refuse to 
avail themselves to the Voluntary Return Program set forth in this MoU, the 
relevant Swedish authority will issue a valid travel document, EU Laissez-Passer. 
 
PARAGRAPH 11 
Preservation of Family Unity 
In accordance with the principle of family unity, the Government of the Kingdom 
of Sweden, in cooperation with the other Parties will, in cases where all members 
of a family, who are all Afghans covered by the MoU, decide to return to 
Afghanistan, make every effort to ensure that families are returned as units and that 
involuntary separation is avoided. Family reunification, shall in all cases, take 
place in accordance with the respective national and international laws. 
 
In order to preserve the unity of the family, spouses and/or children of returning 
Afghans who are themselves not citizens of Afghanistan will be permitted to enter 
and remain in Afghanistan. This commitment will also apply to non-Afghan 
spouses as well as children of deceased Afghans who may wish to enter and remain 
in Afghanistan, in order to ensure preservation of family links. Accordingly, the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan well regularize the entry and stay in Afghanistan 
of such persons in accordance with the provisions under its national laws on the 
entry and stay of foreigners and will consider favorably their naturalization. Visas 
to this effect will be issued within the shortest possible time by the relevant 
diplomatic or consular representation of Afghanistan. 
 
PARAGRAPH 12 
Special Measures for Vulnerable Groups 
The Parties will take special measures to ensure that vulnerable groups receive 
adequate protection, assistance and care throughout the Return and reintegration 
process. In particular, measures will be taken to ensure that unaccompanied minors 
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are not returned prior to successful tracing of family members or without specific 
and adequate reception and care-taking arrangements having been put in place in 
Afghanistan. 
 
PARAGRAPH 13 
International Access Before and After Return 
In order to be able to carry out effectively its international protection and assistance 
functions and to facilitate the implementation of this MoU, UNHCR will, in 
accordance with national legislation including data-protection, be permitted free 
and unhindered access to all Afghans in Sweden falling under the scope of this 
MoU. Likewise, UNHCR will be permitted free and unhindered access to all 
returnees wherever they may be located in Afghanistan, including at airports, in 
accordance with the Afghan law, and Afghans will be permitted free and 
unhindered access to UNHCR. 
 
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will extend full 
cooperation to UNHCR staff to allow them to monitor the treatment of returnees in 
accordance with humanitarian and human rights standards, including the 
implementation of the commitments contained in this MoU and in Decree No. 297 
of 13.03.1380 (3 June 2002). 
 
In this context, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will inform 
UNHCR about any case of arrest, detention and penal proceedings involving 
returnees. It will make relevant legal documentation on such cases, if any, available 
upon request and permit UNHCR staff prompt and unhindered access to such 
returnees. 
 
The access permitted to UNHCR under this paragraph will, as appropriate, extend 
to intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations with which UNHCR. in 
consultation with the respective Party, may enter into agreements for the 
implementation of one or more components of the voluntary return programme 
covered by this MoU. 
 
PARAGRAPH 14 
Safe Nature of Return Travel 
In implementing this MoU, the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden will retain 
responsibility for the safety of Afghans who return under the provisions of this 
MoU until their departure at a border-crossing point. The responsibility for the 
safety of the returnees and responsibility for their personal property during travel 
will rest with the carrier and, if applicable, the international organization 
implementing travel. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will 
be responsible for their safety within the territory of Afghanistan. 
 
PARAGRAPH 15 
Health Precautions 
 The Government of the Kingdom of Sweden will ensure that all Afghans returning 
under this MoU are provided, when considered necessary, with a basic medical 
examination and vaccinations prior to their return and given the opportunity of 
access in cases of emergency, to necessary medical care in Sweden. 
 
PARAGRAPH. 16 
Immigration and Customs Formalities 
'To ensure the expeditious return of Afghans and their belongings, the Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Kingdom of 
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Sweden will, in respect to such persons, simplify and streamline their respective 
immigration, customs, health and other formalities usually carried out at border 
crossing points. 
 
The returnees' personal property, including household and electronic items, hard 
currency, and food, will be exempted from all customs duties, charges and tariffs, 
provided that such property is not prohibited for exportation under the relevant 
national laws and rules and not prohibited for importation under the relevant 
Afghan national laws and rules. Lists specifying such items will be submitted by 
the two respective Parties as soon as possible following the signing of the MoU. 
 
PARAGRAPH 17 
Airport Arrival and Transit Arrangements 
The Parties decide that the appropriate mode of return from Sweden to Afghanistan 
is by air and that arrival will take place at Kabul Airport. UNHCR and the 
organization implementing return travel will, if applicable. be permitted 
unhindered access to receive returnees at the airport. With the assistance of the 
other Parties and financial support provided by the Government of the Kingdom of 
Sweden, the Government of the' Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will ensure that 
appropriate reception facilities are in place to receive returnees, particularly those 
belonging to vulnerable groups. in transit to their intended destination, to the extent 
this is considered necessary by the Parties. 
 
Where necessary and appropriate, the Parties may seek the understanding and 
acceptance of neighboring countries to permit returnees to transit through their 
territory to reach their places of origins in Afghanistan by the most direct and safe 
route. 
 
PARAGRAPH 18 
Mine-Awareness 
The Parties will cooperate to ensure, with financial support provided by the 
Government of the Kingdom of Sweden, the provision of adequate mine awareness 
counseling to returning Afghans regarding risks of mines and unexploded 
ordinances. 
 
PARAGRAPH 19 
Return Transportation Assistance 
The Government of the Kingdom of Sweden will, according to the Swedish 
legislation, meet the costs of travel for Afghans covered by this MoU up to the 
final destination in Afghanistan and in accordance with Swedish regulations of 
their luggage - including administrative costs to arrange for travel. 
 
In addition, in order to facilitate re-integration, the Government of the Kingdom of 
Sweden will also offer a return package to Afghans returning to Afghanistan under 
the provisions of this MoU. Allowances will be regulated by the Swedish return 
programmes. 
 
PARAGRAPH 20 
Reintegration Assistance 
The Government of the Kingdom of Sweden will continue to consider favorably 
the provision of support to reconstruction and rehabilitation projects with' a view to 
facilitating the re-establishment of livelihoods in Afghanistan of returnees taking 
into account the broader reconstruction needs of Afghanistan, 
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PARAGRAPH 21 
Co-ordination Mechanisms 
In implementing this MoU, the Parties are committed to coordinating and 
consulting closely with each other. In this regard, relevant information except 
person-specific information related to the content of asylum-claims - will regularly 
be shared between the Parties, in particular between the respective diplomatic 
missions of the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and with the respective UNHCR offices and other 
relevant partners in both countries. 
 
Designated representatives of the Parties will form a Working Group to monitor 
and discuss the implementation of this MoU. The Working Group will meet when 
necessary. The Working Group may, whenever it considers it useful and 
appropriate, invite representatives of relevant organizations to participate in its 
deliberations in an advisory capacity. Decisions of the Working Group will be 
based on the mutual consent of the designated representatives or their designated 
alternates, 
 
PARAGRAPH 22 
Personnel 
The Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan will facilitate the entry and stay, through issuance of visas 
as necessary, in accordance with their applicable national immigration laws, .of 
their officials and personnel as well as of UNHCR staff and of staff of 
organizations assisting UNHCR in facilitating the implementation of the MoU. 
 
PARAGRAPH 23 
Continued Validity of other Agreements 
This MoU will not affect the validity of or derogate from any existing instruments, 
agreements, arrangements or mechanisms of cooperation between the Parties. To 
the extent necessary or applicable, such instruments agreements, arrangements or 
mechanisms may be relied upon and applied as if they formed part of this MoU to 
assist in the pursuit of the objectives of this MoU, namely the return and 
reintegration of Afghans. 
 
PARAGRAPH 24 
Resolution of disputes 
Any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this MoU. or for 
which no provision is expressly made herein will be resolved amicably through 
consultations between the Parties. 
 
In particular, the Parties accept to address possible questions of statelessness with a 
view to avoid its occurrence and to seek solutions to address the hardships entailed 
for those affected, 
 
PARAGRAPH 25 
Coming Into effect 
 This MoU will come into effect upon signature by the Parties. 
 
PARAGRAPH 26 
Amendment 
 This MoU may be amended by mutual consent in writing between the Parties. 
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PARAGRAPH 27 
Termination 
This MoU will be valid until 31 December 2008. 
In witness, whereof, the representatives of the Parties have signed this MoU. 
DONE at this in three original copies 
For the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden 
Annex 
Paragraph 19 of this MoU refers to return programmes available for Afghan 
nationals returning from Sweden to Afghanistan. 
 
First there is one repatriation programme for persons who have been granted 
residence permit and have decided themselves to return. Such persons can apply 
for an allowance to move back to their native country. The allowance covers travel 
expenses from Sweden plus a cash amount to facilitate resettling. The cash amount 
is maximum 10 000 Swedish Crowns (SEK) for each adult and 5 000 Swedish 
Crowns (SEK) for each child under 18 years of age. The maximum allowance for 
one family is 40 000 Swedish Crowns (SEK). 
 
Secondly there is a programme for persons whose application for residence permit 
has been rejected and who intend to return voluntarily to their country of origin. In 
order to facilitate their return, such persons will be able to apply, as of 1 August 
2007, for a special allowance. 
 
The allowance amounts to 20 000 Swedish Crowns (SEK) per adult and 10 000 
Swedish Crowns (SEK) per child, with a maximum limit per family of 50 000 
Swedish Crowns (SEK). 
 
The exchange rate between Swedish Crowns (SEK) and United States Dollar 
(USD) is approximately at present: 100 SEK= 14,30 USD 
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